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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
THE PROGRESSIVE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN BRAZIL, 1964-1972: 
THE OFFICIAL AMERICAN VIEW 
by 
Sigifredo Romero 
Florida International University, 2014 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Ana Maria Bidegain, Major Professor 
This thesis explores the American view of the Brazilian Catholic Church through the 
critical examination of cables produced by the U.S. diplomatic mission in Brazil during 
the period 1964-1972. This thesis maintains that the United States regarded the 
progressive catholic movement, and eventually the Church as a whole, as a threat to its 
security interests. Nonetheless, by the end of 1960s, the American approach changed 
from suspicion to collaboration as the historical circumstances required so. This thesis 
sheds light on the significance of the U.S. as a major player in the political conflict that 
affected Brazil in the 1964-1972 years in which the Brazilian Catholic Church, and 
particularly its progressive segments, played a fundamental role. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
The role of the Catholic Church in the public life during the military dictatorship 
that ruled Brazil between 1964 and 1985 has been the object of an important debate in the 
Brazilian and the brazilianist American historiography. There is no surprise that in that 
time of important political transformations, the Church played a definitive role. In this 
thesis I explore the U.S. views and interests in the Brazilian Church during the years 
1964-1972, which correspond to the first period of the dictatorship. 
The present research is underpinned by the controversial role the United States 
played in Latin American politics in the decades of the 1960s and 1970s. Particularly in 
the Southern Cone, those were years marked by the imposition of military dictatorships 
that were supported by the US.1 Those regimes abolished democracy and implemented 
dirty war policies under which thousands of people were tortured, murdered and 
disappeared. The Brazilian regime belongs to that tradition and the support it derived 
from the United States is common knowledge.2 
                                                            
1 See William Blum, U.S. Military and CIA Interventions since World War II (Monroe, Me.: Common 
Courage Press, 2004). 
 
2 The documents that proved the military support of Lyndon B. Johnson’s government to the rebels of 1964 
were declassified in 2004 and can be consulted freely. See:  “Brazil Marks 40th Anniversary of Military 
Coup: Declassified documents shed light on U.S. role,” National Security Archive, last modified February 
9, 2014, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/index.htm 
 2 
Along with other segments of Brazilian society, the Church was the object of 
persecution and repression by the military because of the political commitments of some 
of its members. The persecution led to a bitter confrontation between a major sector of 
the Brazilian Church and the military government that marked the political life of Brazil 
during those years. Although the so-called “Church-state relations” are a fundamental 
piece of the U.S. American view of the progressive Brazilian Church, this research is not 
limited to “Church-state relations.” 
Instead, my intention is to understand the United States government’s political 
views, conceptions of and interests in the Brazilian Catholic Church in the years 1964-
1972. Those views and interests seem highly influenced by the ideological context of the 
time. On one hand, the U.S. discourse of domination over Latin America was marked by 
its Doctrine of National Security. On the other hand, by that time Brazil was the epicenter 
of an emergent continental movement within the Catholic Church that challenged U.S. 
hegemony and was known as Liberationist Christianity.3 In this context, the U.S. 
establishment regarded the progressive wing of the Brazilian Church as a likely threat to 
the American interests.4 Furthermore, the involvement of the CIA and other U.S. 
                                                            
3 I have borrowed the term “Liberationist Christianity” from Michael Löwy. It is, in my opinion, the most 
appropriate way to describe what is commonly known as “Liberation Theology.” See: Michael Löwy, The 
War of Gods: Religion and politics in Latin America (London: Verso, 1996), 32-33. 
 
4 See: Richard L. Rubenstein and John K. Roth, The Politics of Latin American Liberation Theology: The 
challenge to U.S. public policy (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute Press, 1988). 
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agencies in the persecution of the liberationist movement has already been subject of 
research.5 
The present study focuses on the cables of the U.S. Foreign Mission in Brazil that 
deal with the Church during the years 1964-1972 and analyses them in light of the 
ideological trends and the political conflicts of the time. As a whole those documents will 
be interpreted with a view to clarifying the perceptions, views and interests that surely 
had an impact in US American foreign policy in Brazil. Taking into account that these 
sources were hitherto unused, my hope is that this paper will add to a better 
comprehension of the US role in the religious-political transformations of the last decades 
in Brazil. 
Literature Review 
There is an important number of works and contributions to the different fields in 
which this work is located. Repression, political persecution and the relation between the 
military regime and the opposition has been the subject of important debates since the 
very time of the dictatorship. State and Opposition in Military Brazil by Maria Helena 
Moreira Alves of 1985, and the diverse reports of the Brazilian Peace and Justice 
Commission are just two conspicuous examples.6 
                                                            
5 See: Penny Lernoux, Cry of the People: United States involvement in the rise of fascism, torture, and 
murder and the persecution of the Catholic Church in Latin America (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & 
Company, 1980). 
 
6 Maria Helena Moreira Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1985). 
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The most recent important contribution concerning U.S. participation in the coup 
d’état of 1964 and its support of the subsequent military regime came in 2008 with O 
Grande Irmão: Da operação brother Sam aos anos do chumbo by Carlos Fico.7 In the 
review of the literature I will refer to the literature on the narrower field of the Catholic 
Church in its political dimension during the first half of the dictatorship which has very 
often been understood as Church-state relations. 
A first important contribution in this regard came in 1971 as L’Eglise et le 
Pouvoir au Brésil, translated to English in 1973 as Church and Power in Brazil.8 The 
author, the French priest Charles Antoine, was a protagonist of the events, who was 
forced to leave Brazil in 1969 as a result of government persecution. Antoine offers a 
very detailed account and a clear understanding of the evolution of the Church’s role and 
the political conflict with the military during the first five years of dictatorship. Very 
significant events came after Church and Power in Brazil, events that would redefine the 
1964-1969 period of Church-state relations but Antoine’s contribution remains relevant. 
The characteristics of Antoine’s work would be present in most of the 
historiography of the Church under the dictatorship. Firstly, since the Church-state 
confrontation of the 1960s was a media phenomenon, newspapers and journals have been 
a most important source of data. The press not only published stories on arrests of priests 
and judiciary processes, but also used to publish the declarations and letters of bishops 
verbatim. On the other hand, as a result of the military censorship and persecution of the 
                                                            
7 Carlos Fico, O Grande Irmão: Da operação Brother Sam aos anos de chumbo: O governo dos Estados 
Unidos e a ditadura militar brasileira (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2008). 
 
8 Charles Antoine, Church and Power in Brazil (Maryknoll, NY.: Orbis Books, 1973). 
 5 
intellectual sectors of Brazilian society, many of the contributions from those opposing 
the military government to the field come from overseas. 
Brazilian and Latin American efforts to understand this period of the Church have 
focused on the different elements that form and explain Liberationist Christianity. Some 
authors focus on Catholic Action and the student movement,9 others on the Basic 
Ecclesial Communities,10 and yet others explain the emergence of Liberationist 
Christianity as a continental process.11 Those phenomena, and particularly the political 
aspect of the Church, have attracted the attention of American researchers as well. 
Interest intensified by the end of the 1970s following the prominence of the Church in the 
defense of human rights and the participation of Christians in the Sandinista revolution of 
Nicaragua. 
That is the framework for Cry of the People by journalist Penny Lernoux (see 
note 5). Published in 1980, the book focuses on the struggle of important elements of 
Catholic Church for the defense of human rights and a more egalitarian Latin America. 
Lernoux sheds light on the persecution of progressive Christians by a conglomerate of 
U.S. agencies, Latin American governments and transnational corporations, among 
                                                            
9 See: Ana María Bidegain, La Organización de Movimientos de Juventud de Acción Católica en América 
Latina: Los casos de los obreros y universitarios en Brasil y Colombia entre 1930 – 1955, parte III (Brasil) 
(PhD diss., Catholic University of Lovaina, 1979). Also: Luiz Alberto Gómez de Souza, A JUC: Os 
estudantes católicos e a política (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1984). 
 
10 Recent works about the Basic Ecclesial Communities have brought new interpretations. For a study with 
gender perspective, see: Carol Drogus, Women, Religion, and Social Change in Brazil's Popular Church 
(Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997). For an understanding of the decline of the 
communities, see: Manuel Vásquez, The Brazilian Popular Church and the Crisis of Modernity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
 
11 For a longue durée interpretation, see: Enrique Dussel, A History of the Church in Latin America: 
Colonialism to liberation (Grand Rapids, MI.: William B. Eerdmans, 1981). For a most recent and 
comprehensive view, see: Löwy, The War of Gods. 
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others. Cry of the People has become a classic in the field for the breadth of its research, 
the multiplicity of facts involved and the braveness of an author who denounces the 
crimes of powerful institutions. Moreover, Lernoux brings new data and sources from 
several documental niches, including the U.S. Congress, Amnesty International and the 
documentation service of the U.S Conference of Catholic Bishops. 
American brazilianist scholarship on the Catholic Church was also vitalized in the 
1970s and 1980s decade. Among the authors who best know the Church during the 
dictatorship Thomas Bruneau, Scott Mainwaring, Ralph Della Cava; and, more recently, 
James Green and Kenneth Serbin, stand out. An early effort by an U.S. American 
researcher to explain the situation of the Church in the 1960s decade was Thomas 
Bruneau’s The Political Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church, published in 
197412 which was followed in 1982 by The Church in Brazil: The politics of religion.13 
While the first is a historical account that explains the ideological changes within the 
Church, the second, by the time it was published, was a synchronic analysis of the 
institution. 
In 1986 Scott Mainwaring contributed to the debate with The Catholic Church 
and Politics in Brazil 1916-1985, a work which followed the same pattern of diachronic 
historical account as The Political Transformation, but also included the 1974-1985 
                                                            
12 Thomas Bruneau, The Political Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1974). 
 
13 Thomas Bruneau, The Church in Brazil: The politics of religion (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1982). 
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period, not covered by Bruneau.14 The political performance of the Church during 1974-
1985, period known as abertura, was also covered by the recognized brazilianist Ralph 
Della Cava in a working paper published by the Kellogg Institute in 1988, The Church 
and the Abertura in Brazil 1974-1985.15 
Twenty-seven years passed between Antoine’s book and Kenneth Serbin’s article 
“Anatomy of a Death,” published in the Journal of Latin American Studies in 1998.16 
Serbin examines the assassination of student Alexandre Vannucchi Leme in 1973 and the 
Church-state crisis that this event provoked. “Anatomy of a Death” is interesting, among 
other factors, because it brings up the importance of the Vatican as an actor in the 
political conflict. Moreover, Serbin analyses the Bipartite Commission, a space for a high 
level negotiation between the Brazilian bishops and military in the1970-1974 years. 
Precisely the Bipartite Commission would be the subject, two years later, of 
Secret Dialogues that explores new dimensions in the political role of the Church and its 
relation with the military.17 Serbin’s findings were possible because of new sources like 
the archives of the repressive apparatus of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro that were opened 
to research by the mid-1990s, and documents of the Bipartite Commission, unsealed 
since 1992 by General Antonio Carlos da Silva Muricy. 
                                                            
14 Scott Mainwaring, The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916-1985 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1986). 
 
15 Ralph Della Cava, The Church and the Abertura in Brazil, 1974-1985 (Notre Dame, IN.: Helen Kellogg 
Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, 1988). 
 
16 Kenneth Serbin, “The Anatomy of a Death: Repression, human rights and the case of Alexandre 
Vannucchi Leme in authoritarian Brazil,” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Feb., 1998): 
1-33. 
 
17 Kenneth Serbin, Secret Dialogues: Church-state relations, torture, and social justice in authoritarian 
Brazil (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000). 
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Besides Serbin, there has been in the last years another important contribution to 
the understanding of the role of the church under the dictatorship. James Green’s We 
Cannot Remain Silent of 2010 is the first research in the field carried out after the 
declassification of the documents that proved the U.S. government’s involvement in the 
coup of 1964, which is an integral part of the book.18 However, that is not the subject of 
We Cannot Remain Silent; rather the focus is the social movement that emerged in the 
U.S. against the Brazilian dictatorship. The movement made a campaign of information 
about human rights violations in Brazil and constituted a pressure group working to make 
Washington change its policy of complicity. U.S. and Brazilian, Protestant and Catholic 
religious networks would be determinant in this movement. 
Taking into account the works already published and the development of the 
debate, my thesis can contribute to the understanding of the international relevance of the 
Catholic Church, its conflict with the military regime and the position of the United 
States. Moreover, there is a longstanding need to introduce into the debate the sort of 
sources that have been used here. The second chapter of this thesis is composed of a basic 
and necessary examination of the sources, and includes a methodological outline of the 
entire research. The third chapter is a historical contextualization that brings together all 
the elements of the subject: the political role of the Church in Brazil, factors in 
understanding the military dictatorship and the role of the U.S. in Brazilian affairs. The 
fourth and fifth chapters are the core of this paper. In the fourth chapter, the sources are 
interpreted with a diachronic approach that results in a narrative of the history of the 
                                                            
18 James Green, We Cannot Remain Silent: Opposition to the Brazilian military dictatorship in the United 
States (Durham, NC.: Duke University Press, 2010). 
 9 
Church in the 1964-1972 period from the American standpoint. The fifth chapter utilizes 
the sources from a rather synchronic standpoint that takes into consideration and stresses 
elements that would go unnoticed in the previous chapter. In the sixth chapter I present 
the conclusions and suggest further research possibilities. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Analysis of Sources 
The originality of this research lies in the study of largely unused primary sources. 
The contextualization and interpretation of those sources provide the narrative and 
argument of my thesis. Therefore, it is imperative to undertake a most basic documental 
analysis of the sources and make clear the methodological framework used to interpret 
them. 
Communication has been consubstantial to any form of political power. It is a 
fundamental element for the development and consolidation of inner institutions as much 
as for the relations with external forces. At least since Pharaonic epochs, rulers 
established external relations through ambassadors and jealously guarded their records as 
did the Venetian doges, the popes and all sorts of political leaders.19 The rigorous and 
academic study of that sort of documentation is known as diplomatics.20 
                                                            
19 William Moran et al., Les Letres d’el-Amarna: Correspondance diplomatique du pharaon (Paris: Ed. Du 
Cerf, 1987), 17-21. Cited in : Constance Vilar, Le Discours Diplomatique (Paris: Université de Bordeaux et 
L’Harmattan, 2008), 84. 
 
20 The term comes from the Greek diploi that means “folded” and originally referred to the documents that 
were delivered to the soldiers of the Roman Empire when they were licensed. The term was later applied 
for extension to any solemn document. In the seventeenth century Jean Mabillon (1632-1707) founded the 
discipline of diplomatics by doing extensive research to determine the authenticity of mediaeval 
documents. Along with paleography, also developed by Mabillon, diplomatics became a fundamental pillar 
of history. 
 11 
The modern diplomatic discourse that emerged with the Peace of Westphalia 
(1648) is built upon the reciprocity of diplomatic relations and the respectability of the 
diplomats whose immunity every contemporary state is supposed to recognize. 
Represent, negotiate and observe are the three basic functions of any diplomatic service. 
In practice, however, the difference between observation and espionage is blurred, hence 
the informal “honorable spies” attributed to seventeenth century ambassadors. In 
principle, the legality of the means used to obtain the information is the basis for 
discriminating between observation and espionage. Albeit, the difference is unclear 
especially in times of crisis and has led to no few problems among rival nations through 
history.21 
It is worth noting that the diplomatic capacity of a state, just like its military 
strength, depends on its economic superiority. Moreover, in a relation of dependence very 
often the satellite state assumes an ambiguous attitude towards espionage on its own soil. 
Sometimes, when subordinate nations deal with a real or constructed threat from an 
internal enemy, they even accept information gathered by external forces. Precisely that 
scenario could have been possible for the U.S.-Brazil diplomatic relations during the 
dictatorship. 
The 1960s and 1970s were far removed from the technological advances that have 
since made the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) one of the largest intelligence 
organizations of the world. Given the lack of current day technology, during those years 
the diplomatic corps were the eyes and ears of the United States government abroad. 
                                                            
21 Vilar, Le Discours Diplomatique, 94-115. 
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Furthermore, the U.S. had and still has the most robust Foreign Service in the world and 
its functionaries emit a huge amount of information every day. Cables are the official 
way of communication for ambassadors, consuls and reporting officers and have been an 
important source of information for historians. 
The U.S. Foreign Service cables deal with several topics. They report about 
economic and political events, situations and tendencies and all of this, of course, paying 
particular attention to the interests and security of the United States. Regarding politics, 
by the 1964-1972 years, the Foreign Mission in Brazil reported mainly about the changes 
in the balance of power of the regime, alterations of the public order, student and labor 
movements, political repression, human rights violations, the Catholic Church and its 
conflicts with the state. 
The information and analysis provided eventually have an impact in the 
international policy of the U.S. government and its diplomatic relations.22 But the cables 
do not only go to the Department of State; they also inform other diplomatic missions 
around the globe and different U.S. agencies and departments including the CIA and the 
Pentagon in cases of National Security issues. All the information of the Service is kept 
and preserved by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), today the 
largest state archive in the world. NARA states: 
American foreign affairs is [sic] a key issue in United States history. The Department of State is 
designated to lead in the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of American foreign 
                                                            
22 Peter W. Galbraith, “How to Write a Cable: A veteran diplomat explains how it’s really done,” Foreign 
Policy, February 22, 2011. Accessed February 9, 2014, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/ 
how_to_write_a_cable. Clearly, cables and communications about internal affairs of the embassies, visas 
etc., are completely out of consideration in this study. 
 13 
policy and foreign relations. Since World War II, a community of agencies has evolved to deal 
specifically with foreign policy issues. In addition, many other agencies have taken on important 
roles in American national security affairs.23 
During the spring-break of 2013, Professor Ana Maria Bidegain and I, with the 
support of the Department of Religious Studies, did an extensive research at the National 
Archives in College Park, Maryland. We ran straight into the section “U.S. Embassy, 
Brasilia” in the collection “Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of 
State”. Those records consist mainly of unclassified and declassified cables from the 
diplomatic posts in Brazil. 
We picked up all the documents that deal with the Catholic Church between 1964 
and 1972. A total of 167 documental packets, saved in 13 boxes, for a total of 552 pages 
were selected, photographed and classified. Every packet is constituted by a single cable-
document, though some of them contain two or three enclosures composed of 
memorandum of conversations, quantitative data, copies of speeches and public 
declarations etc. In my research, those enclosures are not treated as independent 
documents since they make sense only with the other parts of the cable to which they are 
attached. The average number of pages per cable is 3.5, and only two of them exceeded 
20 pages. 
All the cables are composed of basically four parts. First comes the head that can 
take one third or the whole first page; it is devoted to the technical information of the 
                                                            
23 “Foreign Affairs and International Topics,” National Archives, last modified February 9, 2014, 
http://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/index.html 
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cable including remittent, addressee, location, date, and the topic explained in a few 
words. Right after the head, the reporting officer writes a few lines or paragraphs 
summarizing the content of the cable so those who read it can know the topic without 
having to read the whole document. After this comes the body of the document. In the 
case of long cables, this takes several sections; very short cables, like telegrams, do not 
go beyond a few lines. 
Finally, at the end of the longest cables the officers usually write a few lines 
entitled “comments” that contains very concise analysis of the situation described. For 
analytical purposes this is the most important part of the document, since it adds the 
personal interpretation of the redactor of a document. The comments nuance what the 
press reports and go further into the meaning of particular facts. On no few occasions, the 
comments of the redactor include predictions on the behavior of the actors and on the 
development of the events in the short term. For analytical purposes I have classified the 
documents into four types. 
Telegrams. From the 167 cables, 70 are telegrams that contain a total of 103 pages. 
Telegrams tend to be the shortest type, and rarely exceed three pages. The telegram is the 
fastest way of communication and is, in general, used to send information about the 
important news of the moment or very specific events. Thus the analytical potential of a 
telegram is not extraordinary and sometimes the information they contain does not add 
much to what the redactor has taken from news and other sources of information.24 
                                                            
24 The reader might notice missing words in some of the citations. This is consequence of the telegram style 
that shortens the language and omits prepositions. 
 15 
Reports of Conversations. The next important type of document in terms of quantity is 
the Report of Conversation and there are 50 of this kind. 38 of them contain a total of 43 
Memorandums of Conversations which are enclosures with a particular structure that 
includes, in the first page, the participants, date, place and subject of the dialogue. The 
remaining 12 cables have a rather free redaction structure but still refer to specific 
conversations and interviews. All in all, the reports refer to 55 conversations for a total of 
191 pages. 
Reports of conversations are used by the diplomatic officers to summarize 
informal conversations with key individuals of Brazilian politics. The officers invariably 
deliver an assessment of their interviewees, their relevance, temper and usually political 
positions. For instance, regarding a certain bishop, the officer may say that he is usually 
held to be a progressive, that he is intelligent but risky, etc. The reported conversations 
were sometimes the consequence of furtive and informal meetings where more than one 
person took part; some were even held by telephone. 
From the 55 conversations 51 focus on the Church as the central matter. The 
remaining four deal only obliquely with it but are dedicated to other topics like the 
student movement or the political polarization. A total of 57 people participated in 
conversations with American officers, including 15 bishops, 19 priests (eight of them 
Americans), one source in the Vatican Curia and four Catholic intellectuals, journalists 
and professors. In contrast, only six military, three generals and three colonels, 
 16 
participated.25 The remaining 12 recounted conversations with non-Catholic students, 
intellectuals and politicians. 
All kinds of cables, but particularly the reports of conversations, establish 
important guidelines for the routes of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and other 
countries. Through the cables the American government gets to know who is important in 
a specific moment or situation and who is open to establish a collaborative relation. To 
certain extent, to have a conversation with an American diplomat means talking to the 
U.S. administration. Furthermore, people who regularly speak with the officers have 
more chances to be regarded as an important interlocutor by the higher circles of the 
government. In this way, bishops Dom Hélder Câmara, Dom Eugênio Sales and Dom 
Agnelo Rossi, who were interviewed many times, must have been taken seriously by 
Washington. 
The reason for the numerous interviews with U.S. priests is not difficult to 
understand. On the one hand, out of a historical deficit of churchmen, foreign priests, 
including U.S. Americans, were a very important part of the Brazilian clergy and many of 
them reached prominence. On the other, it stands to reason that American officers in 
foreign countries actively seek to dialogue with people they can better understand, such 
as their fellow citizens. 
Reports. The third group of cable I have used is called simply “report;” there are 37 of 
them. Nonetheless, it is the biggest group in number of pages with 235 as a whole. The 
                                                            
25 This is in conversations in which the Catholic Church was brought up. Most likely, the American officers 
had many more conversations with the military but not all of them would have had the Church as one of the 
topics. Moreover, conversations with members of the high circles of military power would deal with 
sensitive information that remains classified. 
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report is the most standardized of the cables and is mainly used to provide information 
with a deeper analysis than the telegram. In order to better understand this type of cable, I 
have classified them as 1) periodical reports, 2) major reports, 3) minor reports and 4) 
reports about speeches and public declarations. 
There are four periodical reports that inform about a broad range of topics 
including the student movement, the balance of power within Church and military and 
similar overviews. The period that these reports cover vary between one week and six 
months. On the other hand, there are four major reports which are documents of more 
than 10 pages and constitute the type of report most complete, best structured and most 
deeply thought out. Conversely, the minor reports deal with specific events and news; 
there are 17 of them. Finally, there are 12 reports that inform about speeches and public 
declarations mainly from the Episcopal Conference or individual bishops. In the political 
confrontation between Church and military, speeches, interviews and public declarations 
acquired an important political weight. 
Others. The remaining 10 documents evade an easy classification. There are seven 
telegrams headed “Department of State” that contain instructions and requests from 
Washington. There is also a small group of three cables of different types. The first is a 
biographical data form about bishop Dom Jerônimo de Sá Cavalcante, administrator of 
the São Bento convent in Salvador de Bahia; the second is a single page called 
“Memorandum of the files” that seems to belong to a bigger documental packet which 
was lost in the records; the last one is a telegram headed “airgram.” 
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Methodology 
Given that my sources are kept in the official archive of the U.S. government, 
authenticity does not represent a problem. Yet, veracity could still be called into question. 
Prior to the redaction of any cable, the data and facts obtained by the reporting officer 
went through personal processes of comprehension and interpretation. Thus the veracity 
of the material must be questioned. In my thesis, the information is interpreted taking 
advantage of the historical distance, taking into account the context of the document, and 
confronting the data with other primary and secondary sources. All of that is knowledge 
the officer did not have. However, this sort of analysis does not account for the main 
point of this research. The objective here is neither revealing new facts nor falsifying the 
existent historical data but rather to proceed in a discursive analysis of the sources in 
order to understand the ideological position of the subject who writes. 
The documents used for my research are selected, classified and analyzed in order 
to extrapolate the constitutive elements of the U.S. American views and interests in the 
Brazilian Catholic Church. I have tried, as much as I could, to let the documents speak 
for themselves. Therefore, the research took the course that the sources suggested, so to 
speak; the diachronic analysis prevailed and constitutes the backbone of the study. 
Consequently most of the next chapter is a chronological account that explores the 
variations of the American view of the Church along the years. A second variable of the 
analysis was thematic. I chose the most constant subjects of interest for the Foreign 
Service and did a brief examination of them in the fifth chapter. I have made use of 
secondary sources, some of them cited in the literary review that focus on those particular 
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themes: Church-state relations, human rights, the student movement, bishop Dom Hélder 
Câmara, etc. In doing all of this, I have resorted to hermeneutics, discursive analysis and 
comparative methods for historical purposes. 
Although the cables that serve as the foundation for this study are intended to be 
objective descriptions of reality, as any human expression, they reveal important things 
about those who wrote them. When a diplomatic officer starts a conversation, and when 
he sits to write the report, he is acting as an employee of his country. In both cases, the 
function of the officer is to safeguard American interests. I will give one example of the 
sort of analytical process that I have applied to these documents. On March 26 of 1969 
the political officer Richard H. Melton wrote a cable concerning a conversation he had 
held two days earlier with the writer and anthropologist Gilberto Freyre. The 
conversation was actually an interview made by a correspondent of the Chicago Daily 
News in which Melton participated. In his report, the officer wrote, paraphrasing Freyre: 
The Church in Brazil is going through a spiritual crisis. People like Dom Hélder err in thinking 
that the Church should devote itself exclusively to social concerns while neglecting the mystical 
aspect of religion. Communists would like to use Dom Hélder as a vehicle to capture power, and 
he is vain enough to accept their support.26 
To this remarkable comment, more than one level of analysis can be applied. First 
of all, there is no need to think that the officer is not paraphrasing Freyre. The ideological 
differences between Freyre and Dom Hélder were well known, so it is very likely that the 
anthropologist would refer to the bishop in those terms. 
                                                            
26 Report of conversation, Recife, March 26, 1969, State Department Cables, U.S. Embassy, Brasilia, 
National Archives, box 30. 
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Nevertheless it is worth reflecting on the capacity of the officer to lead the 
conversation to certain fields. When the officer asks his interviewee for his opinions 
about the Church, he is already influencing in the final result of the conversation and 
hence in the final report.27 Unfortunately, the officers did not write their reports of 
conversations with question-answer structure. Yet nothing stops me from assuming that a 
report of conversation actually refers to a conversation and not to a monologue in which 
the diplomatic officer is just a receptacle of information. 
While the reporting officer might or might not have had an active role in the 
conversation itself, the exercise of writing the report is completely his. This conversation 
took place on March 24 but the report was not sent until March 26. When writing the 
cable, the officer clarified that he used the notes of the journalist which means that 
between the conversation and the writing of the report there was a period of time that 
may have been up to two days. It is worth considering the mental process of the officer 
during this period of time and how his own ideas and interests would have found their 
way through the writing of the report. 
The personal ideas and interests of the officer, when talking to Freyre and when 
writing the report, helped give form to the final cable, ergo to the American view of the 
Catholic Church. The officer does not only have an active role in the conversation,  and 
the capacity to change the word “progressive” for “controversial” or “polemic” in the 
                                                            
27 This may not have been the case in this particular conversation, due to the presence of the journalist, who 
must have had a more active role than Melton. Yet the question remains important for the 48 reports of 
conversation that have been taken into account for this research. 
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report. He also has a role in selecting the information he collected, leaving out what he 
considers unimportant and stressing what he considers relevant. 
For the officer Melton it was important to say (that Freyre said) that Dom Hélder 
Câmara could eventually become a vehicle of communism. That was important 
information to share. To conclude, even though it seems that the officer is only 
transmitting the opinion of one of the most important intellectuals in Brazilian history, he 
is in fact sending an alert to Washington regarding the dangerousness of Dom Hélder to 
U.S. interests. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Historical Background 
Brazilian history and society stands off from Spanish-speaking America. 
Language and immense natural barriers have contributed to the isolation of Brazil from 
the rest of the subcontinent. Furthermore, Brazilian processes of colonization, 
independence and social change have been carried out in very different ways. One of the 
most conspicuous elements of the difference is the compromising character of those 
processes. In comparison to the sociological violence of countries like Mexico and 
Colombia, or the political polarization of Chile and Argentina, Brazil, where neither 
violence nor polarization are absent, presents a record more of accommodation. The 
Brazilian Catholic Church and its role in the political realm are singular as well. 
The Church had not played nearly the same role to consolidate absolutism in 
Portugal as it did in Spain. Hence it had a less important role in the imposition of the 
colonial apparatus in Brazil. Furthermore, in a territory almost as large as the rest of 
South America, the Catholic Church experienced serious difficulties in covering Brazil 
with priests and missionaries and developing the diocesan structures. Yet the Church was 
a fundamental pillar of Brazilian society during the colonial times. With the 
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establishment of the independent Empire of Brazil in 1822, and particularly under the 
reign of Pedro II (1831-1889), the Church became entirely subjected to the state.28 
Later on, with the advent of the republic in 1889, state and Church separated and 
the latter was left outside of the official public realm. For the political elites that had 
enthusiastically embraced the European ideologies of progress and secularization the 
Church did not represent a sufficiently modern institution for a new Brazil. For the 
Church, on the other hand, splitting from the state meant achieving independence. 
During the1920s, as the nation underwent deep economic changes and a decline 
of the republican order, the Church advanced in its unification and started gaining 
importance in the public realm again. Both processes were tied to the leadership of Dom 
Sebastião Leme da Silveira Cintra, better known as Dom Leme (1882-1942), archbishop 
of Olinda and Recife since 1918, of Rio de Janeiro since 1930 and first Latin American 
cardinal. Under his guidance, the different dioceses in which the Church was divided at 
the time started having a common agenda. 
Dom Leme wanted to gain for the Church a leading role in the political space 
without becoming a client of the state. He also endeavored to re-Christianize the 
Brazilian elites that, in his opinion, had fallen to modern ideologies.29 Dom Leme focused 
on reorganizing the laical associations in existence and developing a Catholic 
                                                            
28 Bruneau, The Political Transformation, 22. 
 
29 August Comte’s positivism, for instance, did not have more influence in any other country outside France 
than in Brazil. Ordem e progresso (order and progress), the motto of the Brazilian flag, was inspired by 
positivism. 
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intelligentsia.30 His policies were in agreement with the transformations of the Church in 
Europe. 
As part of the process of modernity, liberal and socialist metanarratives and 
movements had been emptying Catholicism of followers and power. Towards the end of 
the nineteenth century the Church finally gathered new impulses to reestablish its lost 
connection with the city of man. However, in order to survive in a modern world, it had 
to embrace some modern ways. For instance, to fight against liberalism and socialism, the 
adoption of organizational processes typical of those movements was necessary. 
That is how in the second half of the nineteenth century there had emerged in 
Europe, Catholic unions, parties and movements of lay persons active in pastoral 
activities; the latter would be eventually known as Catholic Action, a movement which  
had started in Italy. Within Catholic Action, lay people, particularly young students and 
workers, were called to have a more active role in the conservation and expansion of the 
Church, though under the strict rule of the hierarchy. In this way the clergy was able to 
penetrate spaces from which the Church had been banished during the process of 
secularization. In terms of hierarchical structure and conception of the world, this sort of 
organization was highly conservative. That was the kind of Catholic Action that, with the 
support of Dom Leme, was introduced to Brazil in the 1920s.31 The experiment would 
prove successful in a country with a historical lack of clergy. 
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31 Ibid., 84. 
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In order to promote Catholic ideology, in 1922 Dom Leme and the Catholic leader 
Jackson de Figuereido founded the Dom Vital Center. The Center was frequented by 
ardent integralistas who, via the A Ordem journal, disseminated reactionary religious-
political ideas.32 Both the development of a Catholic intelligentsia and the spread of lay 
organizations like Catholic Action strengthened the position of the Church in the public 
realm during the 1920s and paved the way for the reconciliation with the state in the 
1930s. 
In October of 1930 a revolution led by Getúlio Vargas took power and put an end 
to the republic. During the next 15 years of Vargas’ rule, Brazil lived through enormous 
advances in industrialization, modernization and a significant expansion of the 
economy.33 As the cities grew, the middle classes and the proletariat, precisely the basis 
of Vargas’ political support, strengthened numerically and politically. In the case of the 
workers, Vargas stimulated the growth of labor unions under the strict control of the state 
and in 1932 promulgated a law that allowed working women to vote.34 
Although Vargas faced significant opposition including armed insurrections, the 
1930s was a period of optimism and national pride. Arts and popular culture flourished as 
musicians and intellectuals produced works and interpreted their times with keen national 
                                                            
32 Mainwaring, The Catholic Church, 31. Integralismo was a conservative political doctrine of nationalist 
and corporatist character that became successful mainly in Portugal and Brazil; it is usually referred to as a 
sort of Catholic, Iberian fascism. 
 
33 Vargas ruled plainly as chief of government until 1934 when he was elected president by the congress. In 
1937 he abolished democratic institutions and ruled as dictator until his defenestration in 1945 in a period 
known as the Estado Novo. Later he would be elected president in 1950. This term ended with a political 
crisis that led to his suicide. 
 
34 Bradford Burns, A History of Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 352. 
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fervor. At the same time, the ambitions and worldview of Brazilians acquired a renewed 
cosmopolitan character while the education system modernized and expanded from basic 
to higher level. 
Nonetheless, the Vargas’ era was also characterized by centralization and 
concentration of power in the hands of Vargas. Despite the undeniable authoritarian and 
at times fascist character of his government that drew on censorship and the outlawing of 
movements such as communism and integralismo, Vargas followed the compromising 
trend of Brazilian political history.35 He maintained relations with the coffee-based elites 
and the industrialists, ruled for the middle class and the proletariat and was supported by 
both military and churchmen. 
During the 1930s Church and state reintegrated and provided incommensurable 
services to each other. Dom Leme had played a fundamental role in Vargas’ rule from the 
very beginning. In the days of the revolution, the bishop served as a mediator and 
facilitated the removal from power of President Washington Luís ergo the ascension of 
Vargas. In 1931 Dom Leme organized monumental mobilizations of devotion to Our 
Lady of Aparecida and the statue of Christ the Redeemer was inaugurated in Rio. 
Nowadays both are powerful symbols of the presence of the Church in quotidian life 
through which Brazil is configured as a Catholic nation.36 
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Vargas saw in the Church a fundamental piece of both the new Brazil he was 
building and the balance of power that maintained him 15 years in power.37 He 
stimulated the expansion and influence of the Church in education, beneficence and 
public administration, and obtained in the process ideological legitimation. The Church, 
in turn, not only expanded its reach to the lowest segments of the population but also 
participated in the decision-making process in public affairs. 
Dom Leme had authorized, in 1932, the creation of the Catholic Electoral League 
(Liga Eleitoral Católica, LEC), a pressure group with enormous power, through which 
the Church influenced the election of sympathetic candidates and thus the promulgation 
of laws that favored the position of the Church and its values.38 The LEC and the female 
Catholic organizations had enormous influence in the redaction of the Constitution of 
1934: 
Spiritual assistance was allowed in official and military establishments. The religious marriage 
was entirely recognized in the same terms as the civil and divorce was prohibited. The most 
important thing for the Church was the constitutional recognition of the religious education in 
public schools and the economic subvention by the state to the Catholic schools.39 
Dom Leme, on the other hand, had direct influence on Vargas. The bishop was 
particularly influential in the government’s decision not to establish diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union as well as in the state attempts not to grant recognition to the 
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39 Ibid., 79. My translation. 
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divorce law imbedded in the Constitution of 1937.40 That charter was the Estado Novo 
legal framework: the 1937-1945 period during which Vargas strengthened his 
authoritarian power and carried out most of his ambitious reforms; during that time, the 
Church-state marriage kept bearing fruits for both institutions. 
Meanwhile, as Catholic Action grew, its connections with European and North 
American lay experiences strengthened. In the decade of the 1940s, Canadian priests and 
young lay Catholics themselves brought to Brazil the French model of Catholic Action. 
The French tradition, a truly modern way of lay apostolate in content and organization, 
gradually permeated and redefined Brazilian Catholic Action.41 The starting point of the 
French model had been the Young Catholic Workers movement, founded by the Belgian 
priest Joseph Cardijn in 1912.42 
Cardijn’s method of Catholic Action was called “revision of life.” It is constituted 
by three steps in the relation between individuals and reality: see, judge and act. With this 
perspective, and in sharp contrast with traditional theology, Cardijn stimulated the young 
workers to think critically. Later on, movements of this kind flourished in universities 
and high schools, particularly in France and Canada. 
In no other Latin American country did Catholic Action expand and grow as 
much as in Brazil. The movement thrived, with particular power in universities 
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(Juventude Universitária Católica, JUC), factories (Juventude Operária Católica, JOC) 
and secondary schools (Juventude Estudantil Católica, JEC). Through those 
organizations an entire generation of young Catholic Brazilians developed a modern way 
to live their religiosity, acquired skills in organization, and became aware of the deep 
social problems of their society. 
An important condition for that was, again, the lack of native clerics because of 
which the Brazilian Church had to rely on foreign clergy. There was a constant flow of 
priests, chiefly from Canada, France, Belgium and the United States. They, and the young 
Catholics who traveled to attend the international meetings of their organizations, kept 
Brazilian Catholicism in pace with the latest developments, in praxis and thought, of the 
European churches. 
Even the Dom Vital Center, once the fortress of the most conservative Catholic 
thought, helped in the development of the new Church that Catholic Action was creating. 
Its founder, Jackson de Figuereido, had died prematurely in 1928 and the Center was left 
in the charge of the intellectual and leader, Alceu Amoroso Lima. Under Alceu, the Dom 
Vital Center became a network that spread the French Catholic humanism of thinkers like 
Jacques Maritain, Emmanuel Mounier, Ives Congar, and others.43 
In 1945, as the liberal states emerged triumphant from the defeat over fascism in 
World War II, Brazil moved towards democracy. Then the restless opposition to Vargas 
strengthened enough to put an end to the Estado Novo. In the almost 20 years of 
democratic governments that followed, Brazil continued through the path of development 
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and compromise among the different parties. The marriage of convenience with the 
Church remained unaltered. 
The 1950s would be marked by the revitalization of the national consciousness 
pushed by the turn of the economy towards oil. During his last term as president (1951-
1954), Getúlio Vargas propelled a movement for the defense of Brazilian resources that 
ended up with the foundation in 1953 of Petrobras, currently one of the major exploiters 
of oil in the world. The motto “the oil is ours” (o petróleo é nosso) helped to strengthen 
the national spirit in Brazil. 
Dom Leme’s death in 1942 had left a vacuum in the ecclesiastical leadership. A 
young and always intrepid Hélder Câmara, as priest first and bishop after, took on his 
shoulders the responsibility for organizing the dioceses under an institutional entity with 
national scope that gave cohesion to the Church. He was vicar of Catholic Action and had 
contributed to the creation of the National Secretariat of the movement in the 1940s, at 
the time the only organization within the Church with a national structure. 
Hélder gathered the skills of some female lay elements from Catholic Action and 
gained the support of Rome to create the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops 
(Conferência Nacional de Bispos do Brasil, CNBB) in 1952;44 it was the beginning of a 
truly national Catholic Church in Brazil. As a national institution unified at the top by the 
CNBB, the Church reached its moment of major expansion and prominence in public life. 
The governments recognized the power of the bishops, the Catholic press and 
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intellectuals maintained a national audience, and Catholic Action had a leading role in the 
social movement in schools, factories, and universities.45 
Catholic Action was definitive for the Church in other ways. Visionary men and 
women, young workers, students and peasants were having considerable influence with 
the clergy at least since the 1940s.46 By the 1950s some of those priests who had been 
close to the youth became bishops. Such is the case of Hélder Câmara. He had even 
militated in the integralismo in the 1930s decade but by the 1940s had gotten deeply 
involved with the Catholic Youth Workers and radically changed his political standpoint. 
Dom Hélder, and other bishops like Dom José Tavora, Dom Fernando Gomes, Dom 
Cândido Padim, and many others particularly from the Northeastern dioceses, became the 
leadership of the progressive wing of the Church.47 
Several factors contributed to the success of the Catholic progressive ideas in the 
Northeast. During the nineteenth and twentieth century, as the southern regions 
industrialized and urbanized, the Northeast suffered stagnation and even impoverishment. 
In this region with the highest concentration of the land, the class abyss was more 
profound than in the rest of the country. Therefore, the Christian inclination for the poor 
faced in the Northeast an outrageous reality of social justice that looked like a bomb 
about to explode. 
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Having young and able bishops in the higher levels of the Church contributed to 
the growth of progressive Christianity. Dom Hélder, for instance, was secretary of the 
CNBB for several years, beginning with its foundation. The progressive bishops, well 
respected and connected, maintained their influence in the state and used it to make their 
dreams of social change real. Probably the most notorious case of the time was the 
Movement for Basic Education (Movimento de Educação de Base, MEB), created in 
1961 by bishop Dom José Tavora. 
Dom Tavora drew on a literacy program conceived by bishop Dom Eugênio de 
Araújo Sales in 1958 and gave it a new stronger spirit. The MEB, driven by the Church in 
the Northeast and supported by the state, proved to be a highly successful literacy 
program. Given that in Brazil the illiterate were not allowed to vote, with this program 
the Church had an enormous impact in Brazilian politics and particularly in the 
Northeastern. The MEB is an extraordinary example of the good relations of the 
progressive wing of the Church and the reformist leaders of the 1950s and 1960s decades, 
especially those of Jânio Quadros (1961) and João Goulart (1961-1964). 
Although the progressive movement was the most important aspect of the Church 
in the mid-twentieth century, Brazilian Catholicism still was the sum and contradiction of 
several standpoints. The inner currents of the Church have usually been divided in 
progressives, moderates and conservatives or traditionalists. The classification usually 
depended on the approach to lay pastoral and the commitment to social issues. The inner 
currents, in turn, were in agreement with a multiplicity of political options that reflected 
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national trends. Some churchmen and lay people, for instance, opted for Christian 
democracy and liberalism. 
The Catholic right, on the other hand, was a very strong sector with deep roots in 
the history of the Church. Meantime, the Catholic traditionalists, corporatists and 
integralistas had established important alliances with the military and other reactionary 
sectors that shared their worldviews; the result of that convergence was the creation of 
the extreme-right movement Tradition, Family and Property (Tradição, Família e 
Propriedade, TFP).48 
Historical Context of the 1960s Decade 
Such was the situation of the Brazilian Catholic Church by the end of the 1950s. 
The 1960s would be years of deep transformations and unrest around the globe. African 
decolonization, revolutionary outbreaks in several countries, emergence of diverse 
subcultures in the West and the expansion and diversification of different ideologies of 
liberation marked the 1960s. In the U.S. and Europe, the Civil Rights movement, the 
opposition to the Vietnam War and the events of May-68 incorporated long-ignored 
demands of gender, racial and ethnic equality. 
Meanwhile, Latin America accelerated industrialization, expanded other spheres 
of production and increased its participation in the international fluxes of capital. 
Economic growth not only increased the capacity of the elites to rule but helped to raise 
an urban middle class, everyday more ambitious and educated. As production and 
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consumerism elevated and globalization consolidated, Latin American culture underwent 
considerable modifications. 
Capitalism, through the expansion of cinema, TV and mass media, altered the 
conceptions of time and space and captivated the anguishes and desires of the entire 
society. Along with an increasing sense of connection to the world and the growth of 
urban cosmopolitan cultures, preexistent identities got enforced. Nationalism, for 
instance, gained new relevance and ideologies of right and left took good advantage of it. 
Nevertheless, development, as understood by the U.S. and the Latin American 
elites, did not mean equality. Huge numbers of the poor population, in search of new 
opportunities, moved to the cities only to end up crowding into the shantytowns of 
México City, Buenos Aires and São Paulo. For them there was no economic growth, but 
impoverishment and new ways of exploitation. The young Catholic students and the most 
committed progressives within the Church were particularly shocked by this reality. 
Everything was set for the reinvigoration of a revolutionary movement of 
liberation in Latin America. Liberation movements are cultural currents composed by a 
myriad of traditions, ideologies and even artistic trends that, depending on the historical 
conditions, increase and decrease with the years. In some way, the movement of the 
1960s was the coming to a new state of consciousness. Converging in that consciousness 
were identities of class and nation, changes in the conceptions of history, new levels of 
creativity, an increased disposition to social organization and cohesion among other 
elements. The fundamental component of the movement in the 1960s decade was the 
self-recognition of some segments of the population as members of a valuable culture, 
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their decision to take control of the destiny of that culture and an inclination towards 
social change. 
The spark that ignited the movement and broke in two the history of Latin 
America was the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959. The success of Fidel Castro 
and the very existence of a socialist country just 100 miles away from Florida gave hope 
to a whole generation and reinvigorated the belief that Latin American societies could 
rule their destinies out from under the shadow of the U.S. From the Rio Grande to La 
Patagonia flourished diverse movements of young men and women who wanted to free 
their countries in one way or the other from their dependence on the U.S. Cuba joined the 
Soviet Union and to a lesser extent China as ideological and, at times, logistical supporter 
of liberationist and revolutionary movements. 
Obviously those who got to the revolutionary and liberationist level of 
consciousness were those in the higher levels of education. Although still restricted to a 
privileged minority, by the 1960s university education was expanding and more people 
had access to it. Universities had traditionally been spaces of debate and alternative 
political proposals and in the 1960s students became the most active and politicized 
segment of the social movement. The importance of the student action was such that they 
were commonly courted, targeted and even persecuted by governments, parties, the 
Church and international interests namely American and Soviet. 
The student movement had more intellectual resources than ever. In the 1960s, 
faculties of social sciences and other institutes prospered while structuralism, 
functionalism and other methodologies consolidated new and complex ways to 
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understand society. If one particular theory marked the political and academic debate 
more than any other, it was Marxism, which by this time was living a moment of 
important modifications and expansion. It had been 20 years since the publication of 
Marx’s Grundrisse, which had opened important and fertile debates concerning a 
humanist Marx; cultural Marxism and other trends were in vogue, some in the theoretical 
field and others as political narratives. 
Marxists and a new generation of intellectuals paid particular attention to the 
place assigned to Latin America in the international context. The elites that had ruled 
since the nineteenth century were heirs of the Enlightenment and defenders of the ideals 
of progress, democracy and the liberal state. Those ideals were in a clear contradiction 
with the living conditions of the majority. The reformists (gradualists) claimed that this 
was the consequence of underdevelopment. Latin America was in an early stage of 
progress and by following the historical steps of Europe and the U.S., it would get to their 
advanced stage of development. Thus, industrialization and modernization had to be 
stimulated. 
In contrast, in those years a new school of progressive intellectuals embraced the 
dependency theory that relies so much on the Marxist view. This theory claims the 
existence of exploitative relations between central and peripheral nations. The dynamics 
of exploitation required that the latter sell basic raw products at low prices and purchase 
manufactured goods at high prices. This unbalanced trade relationship ultimately gives 
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rise to political domination.49 Dependency, therefore, does not only circumscribe the 
economy. Instead, it is a multiplicity of systemic processes that take place in every aspect 
of society, determining, for instance, the euro-centrism of nations like Brazil. The 
generation of the 1960s decade had a precise name for all of this: American imperialism. 
From dependency theory it was deduced that true development in Latin America 
would only be possible once the relations of dependency were broken. In this way, 
dependency theory, actively represented in Brazil through authors such as Theotonio dos 
Santos and Ruy Mauro Marini, constituted a challenge to the basis of the liberal states in 
Latin America and thus to the historical rule of the socioeconomic elites. The theory was 
central for the movement of liberation in general and for progressive Catholic thought in 
particular. 
I have mentioned that the liberationist and revolutionary movement is a cultural 
phenomenon that implies much more than politics, and embraces every facet of culture 
including arts, philosophy and religion. For instance, although the writers of the Latin 
American literary boom did not usually to refer to the concept of liberation, they were 
part of that wave of self-recognition and cultural optimism of the 1960s decade that 
entailed an unavoidable criticism of American imperialism. What that literary generation 
had in common with the liberationists was an intense and creative identification with 
their respective cultures. In their stories the characters and their relations, the landscapes 
and the narratives as such were expressions of a renewed Latin American spirit. 
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Changes in the Vatican 
Important changes were taking place in the Vatican as well. The same year that 
Castro triumphed in Cuba, Pope John XXIII called for a Second Vatican Council. The 
Church had become aware of the need for a substantial reformation of its structures and 
the spirit of Catholicism. Many churchmen felt that their Church was not able to catch up 
with the fast and deep transformations of the modern world. 
The Council (1962-1965) was the height of the process of modernization and 
updating called aggiornamento and marked the most critical time for the Church since 
the time of the protestant schism. It was the opportunity for the progressive sectors of 
Catholicism to introduce changes in the form, content and spirit of Catholicism. 
Anachronistic and even mediaeval laws and structures were suppressed and reformed; the 
religious rites and regulations over clothing, behavior and function of the clergy were 
updated. In some way, in order to keep the pace of history, the Church had to get rid of 
too heavy robes. 
Furthermore, the Council had an important ecumenical character. The Church 
resolved to intensify the dialogue with other religions and conceptions of the world. This 
opened the door to the dialogue with Marxism, something that philosophers like 
Emmanuel Mounier had already done. Mounier (1905-1950) belonged to the French 
tradition of Catholic thought that assumed a modern position in social and 
epistemological issues. Jacques Maritain (1882-1973) is probably the best known of this 
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school and his work went in the direction of a Catholic humanism. He was also 
fundamental for the emergence of a democratic perspective in the Church.50 
Another conspicuous figure was the Dominican Louis-Joseph Lebret (1897-
1966), who made important contributions to the ethical reflections for the modern world. 
Lebret, on the basis of Christian ethics, developed a profound criticism of capitalism and 
neocolonialism. These thinkers were very influential in the mid-twentieth century and 
were highly appreciated in the circles of Catholic Action. Most of the spirit of their 
thought was captured in the documents of the Council and encyclicals like Populorum 
Progressio (1967). 
Behind-the-scenes of the Council, in informal meetings, Dom Hélder Câmara 
played an important role in strengthening the ties among social-minded bishops and 
gaining important spaces for the most progressive wing.51 Eventually, the Council 
provided ideological legitimation to Catholic Action and the growing progressive 
Christianity in Brazil. Bishops, priests and missionaries were encouraged to adopt the 
Catholic Action methodology on the Latin American reality. What many Christians saw 
was the undeniable reality of misery and exclusion in their countries. What they judged 
was that that reality was unchristian. What they did was try to denounce and change that 
reality. 
In Brazil, however, the lay organizations had a sense of urgency for social change 
that most of the episcopate did not share and this led to a crescendo of disagreement. 
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Young students lived the contradiction of belonging to the Catholic Church and to the 
revolutionary and liberationist movement at the same time.52 The involvement of 
Catholic students in politics resulted in the formation of the movement Popular Action 
(Ação Popular, AP) in 1962 during a congress of the JUC in Belo Horizonte.53 The AP 
was the final logical step of a growing sector of Catholic youth that wanted to move from 
a religious movement with political implications to a religiously-oriented political 
movement. 
Bishops in other Latin American churches had made consistent efforts, with 
relative success, to cut off institutional ties with the politicized students. In Brazil the 
youth had much more power, their structures had become important for the Church and 
they counted significant support in the clergy and the episcopate itself. Thus in spite of 
significant controversies with the most conservative wings of the Church, Catholic 
Action in Brazil continued.54 
However, a powerful enemy of the progressive churchmen was taking shape in 
the shadows. When the reaction came in 1964 in the form of a coup d’état, the repressive 
apparatus would make the Church pay a high prize for its connections with the students 
and the nationalist and reformist governments of Kubitschek, Quadros and Goulart 
(1956-1964). 
 
                                                            
52 Beozzo, Cristãos na Universidade, 96. 
 
53 Antoine, Church and Power, 35. 
 
54 Gómez de Souza, A JUC, 189-197. 
 41 
United States and Dictatorship 
At least since the times of the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the 
United States arrogated the right to intervene in Latin American and the Caribbean at 
will. Military and economic supremacy in the rest of the continent was seen as a 
condition sine qua non to fulfill the promise of American manifest destiny. During the 
nineteenth century the U.S. consolidated its power, mainly in Mexico, Central America 
and the Greater Antilles. Little by little, the British Empire lost its commercial supremacy 
in the rest of the continent to the United States. 
American interests in Latin America had since the nineteenth century permeated 
every level of the economy, from mining and the cultivation of bananas to banking, 
financial services and technology. In order to protect its capital and investments, U.S. 
governments have resorted very often to force, and a myriad of other tactics in violation 
of international conventions. The U.S. has suborned, blackmailed, sabotaged and 
intimidated those governments and leaders that do not submit to its interests. When these 
tactics do not work, the U.S .participates in murdering plots and armed uprisings that end 
up with dictatorships human rights violations. On no few occasions the United States has 
drawn on the supremacy of its naval fleet and army to punish societies and governments 
that dare to oppose it. 
Some of the most memorable U.S. interventions have been the invasion of 
Mexico in 1846 that resulted in the dismemberment of more than 50% of the Mexican 
territory, the bombing and destruction of San Juan del Norte Port in Nicaragua in 1854, 
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the occupation of Cuba and Puerto Rico in 1898, of Honduras in 1924, and countless 
incursions into Panamá, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and others. 
Moreover, the United States emerged from World War II as a consolidated global 
power and, in the years that followed, it achieved a considerable expansion of its capacity 
for coercion in Latin America. Nevertheless, with the triumph of the Cuban Revolution, 
anti-American sentiment extended all over Latin America. As the U.S. felt its hegemony 
challenged, its militarist policy in the continent hardened.55 
Even today analysts keep explaining the U.S.-Latin American relations of the 
post-WWII era as framed and determined by the Cold War. In my opinion, this is a 
misleading approach. By Cold War I understand the conflictive and dangerous conditions 
of the bilateral relations between United States and the Soviet Union from the 1940s to 
the 1980s. As part of the confrontation both nations indirectly disputed regions of 
influence in the so-called third world. Such are the cases of Korea, Vietnam and 
Afghanistan. 
However, Latin America, far away from Russia, remained a North American 
fortress; the U.S.S.R. never really had the potential to snatch any part of the U.S. 
backyard. The Soviet intervention was limited to economic and intellectual support for a 
few guerrilla groups and communist parties that never constituted a significant threat to 
the liberal states. The real menace to the American hegemony in Latin America was the 
growing articulation of demands for self-determination in the context of the Cuban 
Revolution. In Latin America, “Cold War” was an ideological construct of the American 
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establishment to create an atmosphere of fear, prone to the spread of the National 
Security Doctrine, a militarist ideology originated by the French occupation in Algeria. 
The American version of the Doctrine was the belief in a Cuban, Russian and/or 
Chinese conspiracy to politically unsettle the region and institute communist rule. Those 
who claimed to know the problem also asserted to have the solution. The doctrine held 
that the communists would take over Latin America by brain-washing the people, 
particularly the youth, with communist ideology. This implied the existence of an internal 
enemy in universities, factories, countries and families. Western civilization had to fight 
them.56 
The new era of North American intervention in Latin America began in 1946 with 
the foundation in Panamá of the School of the Americas.57 In the years that followed, 
thousands of Latin American military officials went to the School to learn how to fight 
the internal enemy. Torture, murder, disappearance of people and other techniques of 
terror were some of the pedagogic content of the School through the years.58 The first 
intervention completely driven under the doctrine was in Guatemala in 1954 where the 
U.S. deposed the democratically elected government of Jacobo Árbens, igniting half a 
century of horror that had its culmination in the indigenous genocide of the1980s. 
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Between the 1960s and the 1980s a series of fundamentalist and authoritarian 
dictatorships, backed and supported by the CIA and U.S. governments, were imposed in 
several Latin American countries. These military regimes established censorship, 
abolished and coopted democratic institutions, persecuted labor and student unions, 
leaders of liberal and leftist tendencies, the intellectual elites of the time and anyone who 
dared to oppose them; all in all they implemented what they had learnt in the School of 
the Americas. They also imposed reforms that served the interests of the foreign capital 
and the economic elites.59 
The Brazilian military were particularly pro-American. Of all the Latin American 
countries, Brazil was the only one that had made a serious effort to participate actively in 
World War II.60 The Brazilian troops that battled in Italy in 1944 were trained by U.S. 
officials and were greatly impressed by American organizational and technological 
advances. Many of the leaders of the coup of 1964, including Generals Golbery de Couto 
e Silva and Castelo Branco, belonged to that generation and had been in touch with the 
American military since then. 
The Higher War College (Escola Superior de Guerra, ESG) was created in 1949 
in an effort to modernize and systematize the military education following the American 
models and ideology.61 In a few years the ESG became the intellectual and political node 
of the Brazilian military. It was a space for the military to discuss and develop their 
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institutional positions regarding the future of the country. Since the ESG also provided 
education to civilians, it helped the military to create close links with businessmen, 
politicians and journalists and spread the National Security Doctrine.62 With the triumph 
of the Cuban Revolution those links strengthened and became a political block that 
counted on the support of the United States. 
In August of 1961 the extreme right demonstrated its capacity for action by 
creating a political crisis that led to the resignation of president Jânio Quadros. They 
wanted to go further and impede the accession of Vice-president João Goulart but were 
contained by the democratic reaction of the people on the streets.63 The nationalist and 
reformist Quadros and Goulart were accused of populism and proximity to Marxism. 
Their protectionist policies in economy, social reforms, reluctance to submit to the 
American isolationist policy for Cuba and good relations with the social movement were 
the target of bitter criticisms.64 
Far-right politics had important links within the Catholic Church, an institution 
with a long anti-communist tradition. Even the progressive bishops who opened the 
Church to the dialogue with Marxism were afraid of the red menace. Communism was 
seen as a dehumanizing ideology that wanted to liquidate family and impose a totalitarian 
order where faith would be seen as nothing more than “opium of the people.” The 
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persecution of Catholicism in the U.S.S.R. added no little component of fear to this 
perception. In sum, communism was the negation of the most cherished Christian 
principles.  
In 1960 the most conservative Catholic sectors created Tradição, Família e 
Propriedade (TFP) that was led by Professor Plinio Correa de Oliveira, bishops Dom 
Sigaud, Dom Castro Mayer and others. TFP had much of its support in the south of the 
country, among the traditional elites of São Paulo, and the political circles associated to 
the ESG, from which it received enormous financial help.65 
This ultraconservative movement began a campaign of incendiary declarations 
and mobilizations in defense of western Christian civilization and against the danger of 
communism. As political polarization deepened, Manichaeism flourished and Brazil got 
immersed in a discursive spiral of violence. Politicians like Carlos Lacerda, bishops like 
Dom Jaime Barros Câmara, and tendentious journalists preached the red danger. Terms 
like “Marxist” and “terrorist,” emptied of content, were used to discredit the smallest 
suggestion of social change. The campaign of destabilization gained support for an 
authoritarian regime, weakened the government and set the conditions for the coup d’état. 
The U.S. participation in the coup of March-April of 1964 has been sufficiently 
documented. In the last decade, declassification of audio tapes of the White House and 
cables of the Department of State have brought to public light what had been a well-
known secret for years.66 The Johnson administration had inherited from Kennedy a 
                                                            
65 Bruneau, The Political Transformation, 227. 
 
66 “Brazil Marks 40th Anniversary of Military Coup.” 
 47 
profound animosity towards the government of Goulart and was more than ready to 
support an antidemocratic change of regime. In the days prior to the coup, the U.S. 
government, at the request of the ambassador in Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, decided to fully 
support the military revolution. During the critical moments, Johnson’s government 
commanded the shipment of a naval task force, arms, ammunition and petroleum to 
support the military.67 
Right after the coup, the U.S., faced with the problem of being aligned with an 
overtly authoritarian government, began a policy of comprehensive paternalism that 
lasted for more than one decade. Ambassador Gordon repeatedly showed himself 
concerned with the “excesses” of the military but continued advocating for economic 
help to the regime. In the first two years of dictatorship, the United States loaned around 
$450 million to the Brazilian government and maintained a policy of public silence in 
regards to political repression.68 
As a corollary to this historical contextualization, I would like talk briefly about 
the chiefs of the Foreign Service in Brazil during the time that concern this research. 
Ambassador Gordon, who was in office between 1961 and 1966, had an outstanding 
diplomatic career and became Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American affairs 
right after leaving Brazil. His academic career was no less remarkable; he taught 
international economic relations in Harvard and was president of Johns Hopkins 
University between 1967 and 1971. The presence of a diplomat of Gordon’s status points 
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to the strategic significance of Brazil for the United States during the decisive aftermath 
of the Cuban Revolution.69 In the same way, in comparison to the coming years, the 
American presence and interference in public affairs was most vehement during the 
service of Ambassador Gordon.70 Gordon was replaced in 1966 by John W. Tuthill, still 
an outstanding diplomat, though his career was modest in comparison to Gordon’s. 
Charles Burke Elbrick replaced Tuthill in March of 1969 under the Nixon administration. 
The last ambassador to Brazil for the time of this research was William Manning 
Rountree who took possession in November of 1970.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Determinants of the American Interest 
The 167 cables of the Foreign Service in Brazil are irregular during the 1964-
1972 years. Still, they follow a pattern that helps in understanding the basic determinants 
of the American interest in the Brazilian Catholic Church.71 The periods with a higher 
frequency of cables related to the Church coincide with periods of increasing relevance of 
the Church or its members in the civil realm. 
A rise of the relevance, in the short term, was expressed in declarations, 
statements, public letters and meetings in which the Church or its members expressed 
changes or reaffirmations in their positions. Most of the time, those discursive 
performances had the government as the clear interlocutor and not a few times were a 
reaction against symbolic or real acts of violence against the Church. These acts of 
violence were also determinants, though secondarily, of the American interests, and 
consisted, in general, of arrests, expulsions of foreign priests, torture, raids and 
accusations of subversion among others. Concomitant with that interest in the Church’s 
relation with the public realm, there was an interest in the internal affairs of the Church, 
the changes in its internal balance of power, and its relations with other sectors of the 
society, such as students. 
                                                            
71 See appendix 2. 
 50 
The gaps and periods of low circulation of cables cannot be simply explained as 
decreases in the relevance of the Church. Certainly, during the periods in which the 
Church-state conflict abated, the frequency of the cables lowered considerably. But there 
exists significant periods of total Church cable absence in circumstances when important 
events were taking place. How to explain, for instance, the absence of cables between 
September of 1966 and February of 1968? During that eighteen months long period, Dom 
Hélder made sympathetic declarations towards Cuba, the military arrested eleven 
Benedictine monks for helping the students of the UNE to have their XXIX congress and 
Dom Waldyr Calheiros, bishop of Volta Redonda, started his struggle for human rights, 
which would eventually make him a frequent target of military repression.72 
It has to be taken into account that during those years, there were other political 
conflicts that included unions, students, parties and different levels of the government in 
which the Church was not involved. Those events and crisis would momentarily distract 
the attention of the American officials from the Church. In history, even the silence 
speaks. The U.S. interest in the Brazilian Church is not only informed by what the cables 
say but also by what they do not. Some meaningful elements about those silences will 
gradually appear along these pages. Yet, bearing in mind the multiplicity of the factors 
that could help to explain the absence of information in the cables about specific events, a 
generalizing explanation in this regards would be too risky. Finally, there is still an 
important number of classified cables as well as information in other collections to which 
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we did not have access; such is the case of the archives of the CIA and other classified 
documents. 
The Dangerous Church 
I have pointed out in the previous chapter that the Doctrine of National Security 
and the Cuban Revolution had produced an atmosphere of political polarization during 
the first half of the 1960s. In Brazil, the progressive wing of the Catholic Church was 
commonly accused of political radicalism and proximity to “dangerous” groups.73 
Accusations centered on the leaders of the Movement for Basic Education, foreign 
priests, and progressive bishops like Dom Hélder Câmara, but particularly on student 
organizations and clergymen involved or supportive with them. 
In the same way, the concerns of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Brazil went along 
the lines of McCarthyism. A cable of January 3 of 1964 from Rio de Janeiro with copy to 
the embassy in Rome reported the spread, during the previous month, of a draft letter in 
which the CNBB strongly warned Catholic Action and its secretary bishop, Dom 
Cândido Padim, of any involvement in politics, and condemned any deviation from 
Christian dogma. It was one more try of the Catholic hierarchy to distance the Catholic 
University Youth from the Popular Action (AP) which did not represent the “authentic 
Christian thought.”74 
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The cable celebrates that the Church “has decided that cooperation with the 
Marxist, theoretically non-Communist Popular Action is more likely to aid Communism 
than the Church.”75 The comment contains some elements that characterized the 
American view on the Church during those years. National Security Doctrine combines a 
paternalistic discourse that negates the moral agency of most of the people and a 
Manichean view of the world as ultimately divided between communism and evil on one 
hand and capitalist democracy and goodness on the other. The Church is regarded, in a 
broad sense, as a naïve institution and a vehicle of communists, extremists or terrorists 
who are malicious enough to deceive and manipulate unwary people to their own ends. In 
this way, the old uneducated bishops, the young and pious priests would almost 
unconsciously be makers of the national debacle in Brazil. Therefore, the Church was 
suspicious. 
The National Security Doctrine had similar understandings of the students. They, 
young and inexperienced, were as easy prey as the priests for the machinations of the 
obscure forces of communism and terrorism. Here, communism and terrorism were 
abstractions that played the role of the enemy in the discursive war. In the real war, which 
used electric shocks and the Nazi tactics of night and fog, the enemies were students, 
priests and other organic parts of society that would not easily be targeted in the 
discourse without causing mental resistance in the majority of the people. This linguistic 
strategy transformed the most progressive sectors of society into dupes at the service of 
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hidden forces. A concomitant linguistic step transformed the naïve dupes into dangerous 
suspects. In the dirty war of the 1960s and 1970s, “suspect” usually meant guilty. 
Another cable of January of 1964 expands the information of the first in regards 
to the connections of the Church with the AP. In this communication, Robert Dean, 
counselor of the embassy, recognizes the role of the Church in the modernization of 
Brazil and points out that some of its elements support and participate in the “negative 
left.”76 Dean depicts the MBE as subverted by extremists and repeats the words of 
Brazilian intellectual Erico Verissimo, for whom the National Union of Students (UNE) 
is “an alliance of the Church with the Communists.”77 Farther on in the same text, Dean 
expresses concern that the draft letter that condemns the AP would not have the approval 
of the majority in the Church because of internal divisions. 
The U.S. was attentive to the Church’s reception of the military regime from the 
very beginning. 26 members of the CNBB met on May 27 of 1964 to have a two day long 
discussion on the Church’s position in regards to the coup. An official statement was 
released on June 2. In the declaration, the bishops expressed gratitude and praised the 
military for their heroic role in the struggle against communism. Furthermore, the 
episcopate made a mea culpa in which recognized the presence in its lines of “victims of 
their own idealism.” The bishops were referring directly to the most progressive sectors 
of the Church in the same paternalistic way of National Security. 
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Nonetheless, at the same time the episcopate expressed uneasiness for the already 
evident hostilities against the Church and rejected the generalizing accusations of 
communism against Catholic Action and the MEB. Farther on, the bishops made 
statements of support for democracy, dialogue and other generalities. One week later in a 
cable, the most independent and critical parts of the episcopal document were observed 
with irony: “The bishops also chose to lecture the revolutionary leaders on the urgent 
need for reforms based on “the social doctrine of the church”.”78 
The cable also highlights the agreement between the contrasted currents inside the 
Church, pointing out that for the first time in recent history the progressive Dom Hélder 
and the conservative Dom Jaime de Barros Câmara together signed an episcopal 
document.79 For Charles Antoine, the declaration of June 2 was the consequence of a 
“laborious compromise” between supporters of the regime and defenders of social 
justice.80 The plurality of the opinions present in the document, on the other hand, may 
have counted for the wide support it received in the episcopate. 
After the coup, the military unleashed a political repression directed mostly at 
political institutions, universities and the Church.81 The repression was carried out 
through public accusations, detentions, raids, intimidations etc. Within the Church, the 
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MEB and the Catholic University Youth, the most progressive structures, were the most 
affected. Since the MEB was dependent on the support of the state, by removing the 
institutional support the military were able to weaken it badly. It would require more 
energy and time from the repressive apparatus to affect the Catholic students. 
Four months after the coup, the Foreign Service reported about a document 
entitled “Misery in Latin America: Fate or wrong-doing?” This document, issued by the 
Catholic students and directed to the priests meeting in the Vatican Council, was 
catalogued by the U.S. officers as “nationalist and anti-American propaganda.” The 
document, which dealt with economic and social problems of the time, contained 
dangerous postures: “The falling prices of raw materials, the rise in cost of manufactured 
goods, U.S.-tied procurement – all the old and often-disproved charges – are used as 
points of attack on the U.S. for “economic injustice”.” The silence of the social 
movement after the first wave of military repression had not lasted too long; now, the 
American officers were setting off alarms about the reappearance and reorganization of 
“leftist Catholic groups” that were becoming “vocal” and “dangerous” again.82 
During those first days of August of 1964, Ambassador Gordon paid a courtesy 
call on the recently appointed Papal Nuncio, Sebastiano Baggio. Gordon expressed 
special interest in the positions the Nuncio would take in regards to the student 
movement, Catholic Rural Unionism and the MEB. If the call had the purpose of 
assessing the proclivity of the new Nuncio to help the American interests, the results 
were ambiguous. The Nuncio indicated “keen interest in the idea of cooperating with the 
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United States Embassy in both the labor and student fields.” Nonetheless, Baggio let the 
ambassador know that he did not share the Manichean attitude of the military that “were 
unable to distinguish between serious cases of Communist loyalties and mere 
progressivism.”83 
The activities of the Catholic Youth were still an important concern for the U.S. 
diplomatic services more than one year after the coup. On May 18 of 1965, Harold M. 
Midkiff, U.S. Consul in Salvador, visited bishop Dom Eugênio Araújo Sales in his office. 
In the subsequent conversation, the bishop talked openly about his policies in the 
archdiocese and the Consul showed interest in the links of the Church with the AP and 
the students in general. Midkiff made reference to Dom Jerônimo de Sá Cavalcante of the 
São Bento Monastery in Salvador who, as a result of his proximity to the student 
movement of Bahia, was seen with suspicion by the military, a suspicion that was shared 
with the consulate.84 
A cable of May 13 of 1965 expounded the life, career and ideas of Dom 
Jerônimo, who was described as a very progressive man, close to Dom Hélder and with 
an enormous influence on the youth: “It seems likely that Dom Jerônimo [sic] will have 
increasing scope for his social reform ideas now that Dom Eugênio Sales has taken over 
the administration of the Salvador Archdiocese. His influence on young people seems 
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certain to be a positive force for developing an alightened [sic] Catholic leadership in the 
Salvador area.”85 
The Conflict Begins 
Gradually, as the military unveiled their socioeconomic policies and it became 
evident that their strength was brute force, a public confrontation between Catholic 
progressivism and the military arose. The center of the conflict was the Catholic Action, 
whose members, favorite targets of the repression, were highly critical of the 
socioeconomic direction of the country. The American cables of the time, though very 
attentive to the Church-state emerging confrontation and to any criticism towards the 
regime, did not show the same interest in the political persecution and the 
authoritarianism of the regime. 
A cable of June 29, 1965 reported the release of a “manifesto” by the Worker 
Catholic Action (Ação Católica Operária, ACO) of São Paulo that denounced the 
situation of unemployment in that city. A few days later, Cardinal Dom Agnelo Rossi 
made a statement that “removed much of the ammunition from the hands of those who 
could have used the ACO manifesto against the government.” The cable also reported the 
arrest and mistreatment of a priest and two students in the town of Goias Velho during a 
protest: “Although physical punishment [italics added] was employed, there is no 
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evidence of any anti-Church campaign.”86 Evidently, in the cable the repressive violence 
is almost disregarded whereas the main concern is the respectability of the regime. 
The cable described other skirmishes, suggesting that “leftist press,” such as the 
journal Ultima Hora, had enormous responsibility in stirring up Church-state conflict. 
The cable criticized Ultima Hora for using words like “torture” and “persecution” in its 
headlines. For the reporting officer, the “alleged coolness” between the two institutions 
was little more than a creation of tendentious leftist press. The most remarkable element 
in the situation was how that alleged conflict was to be used in “anti-government 
attacks.” In sum, the American view of Church-state relations was a total identification 
with the preoccupations of the regime itself: no real concern for freedom, democracy or 
the rule of law, but about the political cost to the military regime of a conflict with the 
Church. 
Church-state relations and the activities of the Catholic youth were still the main 
concern of the U.S. officers by mid-1966. The students, clandestinely organized around 
the UNE, were re-strengthening politically and demanding the support of the episcopate. 
Most of the bishops were more focused on maintaining stable relations with the regime 
and were doing anything possible to cut off institutional ties with the students. But the 
progressives understood their support to the youth as a duty and were ready to assist 
them.87 
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In July, when the UNE had its national congress in Belo Horizonte, the religious 
orders took measures to protect them from state repression and let the students use the 
convents to carry on the meeting. Meanwhile, the bishops of the Northeast, headed by 
Dom Hélder Câmara, gave clear indications of their support to the progressive lay basis 
by endorsing two documents of the Workers Catholic Action ACO of Recife and the 
Catholic Agrarian Youth (Juventude Agrária Católica, JAC). The documents consisted of 
analysis of the socioeconomic situation of the northeastern peasants and workers that 
implied criticisms of the status quo. The final document, with the approval of the 
bishops, came to be known as the “Manifesto of the Bishops of the Northeast.”88 
All of this unleashed the rage of the military that intensified its repression and 
made of bishop Dom Hélder Câmara an object of bitter criticisms and black propaganda. 
Church-state relations had reached its lowest point thus far. In those days, as the 
episcopate showed support for the bishop, the high military circles moved towards 
conciliation. In August, the president, Castelo Branco himself, met with Dom Hélder in 
Recife and silenced the enemies that the bishop had among the military of the Northeast. 
The American diplomatics regarded the protection of the students in Belo 
Horizonte and the manifesto of the bishops as “examples of the increasing activity of the 
Church in Brazilian political affairs.”89 The lack of historical perspective of the Foreign 
Service is noteworthy. As was made clear in the previous chapter, the Church had been 
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involved in political affairs for decades. The difference was that by 1966 there was a 
sector that had adopted a critical distance from the de facto government. 
The Church-state conflict was the center of attention for the American Foreign 
Service in Brazil by mid-1966.90 In the U.S. view, the heart of the matter was the 
attention the conflict had in the media. Furthermore, Dom Hélder and his supporters in 
the episcopate were depicted as belligerents, who kept the scandal alive with new 
statements and declarations. The apparent American concern about the press coverage of 
these conflicts was actually a real concern for the stability of the regime: “What began as 
a relatively mild protest over conditions in the Northeast has by inept local military action 
and inadequate defensive measures on the national level been blown up far beyond its 
real importance. The opposition has naturally made the most of it.”91 
Interestingly enough, American concern for the fate of the regime led the 
consulate to regard not only the Church but the military themselves as a threat to the 
regime. During all the period that this study covers, a sort of disenchantment of the 
Americans with the Brazilian military occasionally surfaces. For the U.S., the Brazilian 
military were incapable of dealing with certain problems and at times their ineptitude 
contributed to worsen the conflict. That perception was inherent to the paternalistic 
character of the National Security Doctrine and other historical relation of the U.S. with 
the world. 
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The Church and Students 
During 1968, the coolness and skirmishes of previous years degenerated into open 
conflict between the Church and state. In consequence, the number of cables grew in 
comparison to the previous years. Moreover, in 1968 the progressive bishops, particularly 
the northeasterners, became more critical of the socioeconomic problems of Brazil and 
opted decisively for protecting the students from the state repression. 
If the U.S. officers regarded the Brazilian military as inept, the events of 1968 
would prove them right. On March 28, a young student, Edson Luis de Lima Souto, was 
killed by the military police during a demonstration in Rio de Janeiro. This provoked the 
indignation of the students, who, with wide support from the masses, started a year of 
tireless mobilizations that would make the government tremble. The U.S. was attentive to 
the situation of the students and their links with the Church.92 In June of 1968, a cable 
from the Consulate General in Recife about a “Church-student alliance in the Northeast” 
read: 
There is growing evidence that the Church in the Northeast is moving toward closer identification 
with student activists. In the past six weeks no less than five leading churchmen have by word and 
deed demonstrated their support for reform-minded university students. While most of the prelates 
involved are associated with the “progressive” wing of the Church which has frequently been out 
of step with the rest of the Church hierarchy, they in this instance at least, are believed to reflect 
the feelings of a growing cross section of their fellow churchmen.93 
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Certainly, the Church of the Northeast strongly supported the students; Dom 
Antonio Batista Fragoso, Dom Hélder, Dom Fernando Gomes, and Dom José Medeiros 
Delgado had moved vehemently in that direction. As a result of the progressive 
inclinations of the Northeastern bishops, they were usually objects of keen observation by 
the American diplomats. It is worth noting the perception of growing unity in the Church 
that the U.S. had by 1968 as a result of the support for the students. 
Had such unity truly been the case, it would very soon be called into question. On 
June 10, the Recife city councilman Wandenkolk Wanderley, probably the most fervent 
opponent of Dom Hélder Câmara in the Northeast, released the contents of a study by the 
Belgian priest Joseph Comblin, who belonged to the circle of the bishop. The study about 
the socioeconomic problems of Latin America was meant to be presented in the General 
Assembly of the Latin American Episcopal Conference (Conferencia Episcopal 
Latinoamericana, CELAM) to be held in Medellin that August. 
The Consulate in Recife regarded the document as subversive and inflammatory 
for claiming the need for a radical change in the socioeconomic structures of Latin 
America. Of particular concern were the Comblin’s criticisms of the U.S.: “The 
document, he [Wanderley] pointed out, made no reference to oppression in the Soviet 
Union and warmly praised the Cuban revolution while criticizing the governments of 
Portugal, Spain and the United States. In short, Wanderley concluded, the document 
opposed all those who combat communism.”94 
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Furthermore, the cable described the controversy ignited in the press by the 
document and judged that the support for Dom Hélder in public opinion had been 
seriously affected. However, at the same time, the cable acknowledges that “Most 
responsible Northeasterners have fortunately learned to discount attacks upon Dom 
Hélder from the likes of Wanderley and his colleagues.”95 Some weeks later, as Tradição, 
Família e Propriedade attacked Dom Hélder, a cable from the Consulate in Recife 
maintained that the ultra-right group attracted people of the sort of Wanderley, who was 
discredited in public opinion for his “almost pathological attacks” against the bishop.96 
This cable shows how, in spite of some proximity, the U.S. services preserved some 
distance from the traditional right wing of Brazil. 
The year of 1968 was key for progressive Catholicism and for the student 
movement in Brazil. During the conference of the Latin American episcopate in 
Medellin, the most progressive bishops, led by the Brazilians, were able to give to the 
Church its most revolutionary push. In the conclusions of Medellin, the bishops used 
Cardijn’s “revision of life” method to understand the Latin American reality and made a 
commitment for social change. For many observers this was the official birth certificate 
of the Liberationist Christianity; the progressivist movement was living a moment of 
hope. Bishops, foreign worker priests and lay people involved in Catholic Action would 
preach openly the need for social change and requested the participation of the people of 
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God in the process. For most of them, this was not much more than the adaptation of the 
Vatican Council to the Latin American reality. 
On the other hand, besides the indignation over the death of Edson Luis, the 
student unrest of 1968 contained further implications. Popular mobilizations in many 
parts of the world were taking place and the revolutionary movements displayed 
enormous ability to summon the masses. People went massively to the streets in the U.S., 
Japan, France, Mexico and the Southern Cone, just to mention a few cases. Consequently, 
the reactionary forces counterattacked with violence; in the U.S., Martin Luther King was 
assassinated and in Mexico the government perpetrated the Tlatelolco Massacre. In 
Brazil, the support of an important sector of the Church for the student movement led to a 
spiral of deterioration in Church-state relations during the second half of the year. 
The military regime, stunned by the popular unrest and the loss of support in the 
remaining political institutions, was moving towards an even more repressive policy. 
Arrests and persecutions were running continuously, which exacerbated the demands for 
democracy and social change, ergo: the mobilizations in the streets. The military rage 
against progressive Catholics was not always able to distinguish the political position of 
individuals. Therefore, the arrests and accusations of subversion and communism in some 
instances ended up affecting moderate and even conservative churchmen. The offended 
bishops, who denounced the persecution and protested the McCarthyism, were gaining 
the support of most of the hierarchy. Even though they reacted as individuals and leaders 
of their dioceses, the less lucid of the military saw an enemy in the Church as a whole. 
 65 
The repressive apparatus, outraged by the Comblin affair, started targeting a 
particularly vulnerable sector of the progressive Catholicism: the foreign priests. In 
November 29, three French Assumptionist priests, a few Brazilian churchmen and lay 
people were arrested in Belo Horizonte. Until they were set free in February of 1969, the 
regime continuously threated to expel them. As a consequence of the progressive line of a 
good part of the foreign clergy, they were a natural target for the military. Moreover, 
taking into account the Church’s dependency on the foreigners, for the bishops a threat to 
them was a threat to the functioning of the Church itself. The U.S. diplomats assessed 
that whether the government was to “employ expulsion as a routine device to dispense 
with foreign ecclesiastics who express public opposition to it,” the strategy would 
produce very different outcomes:97 
Rather than voluntarily restrain themselves in the face of possible expulsion or intimidation by the 
Government, or msek [sic] advice from some bishops, there is every reason to project that such 
foreign progressives would actively seek to challenge to GOB outright with the intention of 
provoking a Church-State showdown. Should such defiance occur, foreign priests would certainly 
be supported by liberal activists among the Brazilian clergy, such as the Dominicans who have 
been in the vanguard of most anti-Government actions by the clergy.98 
This report calls attention to the fact that, for the U.S., the foreign priests were 
radicals who deliberately resorted to provocation to foster Church-state crisis. Even more, 
the consequent and anticipated repression would be opportunistically used to reinforce 
the opposition to the regime. Again, in the short term, the repressive policy of the military 
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in this regard was not just ineffective but counterproductive; it was a factor producing 
unity in the Church. Even the conservative Dom Jaime de Barros Câmara had resented 
the government’s threat to summarily expel the Assumptionists.99 
A Turning Point 
The unceasing student mobilization protected by the progressive Catholics, 
growing discontent with the government in political circles and ideological polarization 
were jointly undermining the regime. In the always difficult balance of power among the 
different factions within the military, the most authoritarian sectors were strengthening. 
In December 13 of 1968, they forced the Institutional Act Number 5 (Ato Institucional 5, 
AI5) that initiated the most severe years of repression. 
The AI5 dismantled the few remnant political structures that the dictatorship had 
not dissolved in order to maintain a democratic façade. The military concentrated its 
power in a small circle, stiffened censorship, prohibited any expression of discontent, 
restricted civil liberties and gave unprecedented powers to the repressive apparatus. As 
the regime made a leap towards a state of terror in which torture, murder and 
disappearance of dissidents became massive, Brazil’s hopes for a quick return to 
democracy faded away.100 
The AI5 brought some slight variations to the U.S.-Brazil relations. As a matter of 
fact, although the American position towards Brazilian repression was generally one of 
complicity, some reservations had never been absent. American diplomats had 
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disdainfully observed the tactlessness of the Brazilian military since the very 
beginning.101 To them, the hardening of the authoritarian character of the regime was also 
a consequence of the military’s ineptitude. 
Moreover, the increase of the repressive policies was badly received by the 
international press. It became increasingly difficult for the U.S. to justify its 
unconditional support for an intolerant regime that systematically tortured its citizens.102 
Emergent international networks of opposition to the dictatorship were taking shape. In 
the U.S., Brazilian exiles, brazilianist scholars, the Catholic Church and American 
Protestant churches began a campaign of denunciation of the repression and increased 
pressure in public opinion to make Washington change its policy of complicity. 
To complicate the situation, on December 15, two days after the imposition of the 
AI5, Darrel Rupiper and Peter Grams, two American Oblates linked to Dom Hélder were 
arrested in Recife. Following the habitual pattern of state persecution, the priests were 
accused of subversion and faced military trial. With the involvement of the embassy on 
their behalf, the priests accepted “voluntary expulsion” and left the country by Christmas. 
During their time in the hands of the military the priests could hear the screams of the 
tortured prisoners. When they landed back in the U.S., they were a living testimony of the 
human rights violations in Brazil. 103 
                                                            
101 Report, Rio de Janeiro, June 29, 1965, State Department Cables, U.S. Embassy, Brasilia, National 
Archives, box 5. 
 
102 Green, We Cannot Remain Silent, 97. 
 
103 Ibid., 99. 
 68 
In spite of all, the Brazilian regime was a natural ally of the U.S.; any change in 
the American attitude towards the military would therefore occur with subtleness: “The 
tightrope maneuvering that State Department officials recommended entailed discreetly 
trying to convince sectors of the Brazilian military to moderate their measures so that the 
political situation would not place the U.S. government in the position of having to 
distance itself from the regime.”104 The State Department judged that either distancing 
itself from the Brazilian military or exerting too much pressure on it would make the 
military adopt an isolationist nationalist attitude. The visit of Rockefeller to Brazil next 
June was to be a sign of American support for the Brazilian government. 
The progressive Catholics had some hopes for a decisive shift in the U.S. posture. 
Facing the enormous limitations on free speech in Brazil and the hardening of the 
repression, the bishops were increasingly resorting to the international community to 
denounce human rights violations. For obvious reasons, the first likely ally was the 
Vatican. At the end of January of 1969, during a conversation between Dom José de 
Medeiros Delgado, archbishop of Fortaleza and the political officer Richard H. Melton, 
the former stated that the Pope and the Vatican were aware of the situation in Brazil and 
that they fully supported the Brazilian hierarchy.105 As we will see, during the next 
months and years the Vatican would play an increasingly important role in the Church’s 
defense of human rights in Brazil. 
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The bishop made other important comments during that conversation. He 
basically showed hopes that the United States would speak out against the deepening of 
the repression and would align on the side of human rights and dignity. Nonetheless, 
Dom Medeiros seemed aware that any move by the U.S. government would be very 
subtle. He was probably thinking that any shift in the U.S. policy would be very unlikely 
under the new administration of Richard Nixon (1969-1974). That was essentially what 
Cardinal Dom Agnelo Rossi said to the American Consulate of São Paulo in February. 
Rossi had fewer expectations than Medeiros; he expected from the U.S. only the 
moderate and friendly advice of a father: 
Rossi commented that many Brazilians thought President Nixon’s election raised hope in 
Brazilian military men that U.S. would be more tolerant to authoritarian conservative regimes in 
Latin America. Some Brazilians even blamed “imperialist” U.S. for inspiring IA-5. In response 
question Rossi replied USG should express to GOB private concern as friend over events in Brazil 
and hope country would soon return democratic path.106 
For the progressive churchmen, the first five years of the dictatorship had 
produced a government against social change that was also repressive. After the AI5, the 
regime was mainly regarded as an enormous repressive apparatus. This affected their 
view of the U.S., which for them, would eventually be no longer the imperialist country 
that supported the regime but a hopeful landscape with an emergent movement for the 
defense of human rights whose government could have a real influence in the human 
rights policy of the dictatorship. 
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A Modern Martyrology 
The AI5 was in some ways a coup within the coup, a victory of the authoritarian 
faction over the moderates of the military.107 As in the events of 1964, the U.S. was 
highly interested in the official position of the Church. As a first reaction, the leaders of 
the Church had ceased to refer openly to the situation and took the AI5 as a fact with no 
chance for a quick reversal. Although most of them totally rejected the AI5, their attitude 
was of openness to dialogue and collaboration with the government. They were giving 
the government the benefit of the doubt in regards to the AI5. The Diocese of Guanabara, 
in particular, was striving for dialogue with the government in order to appease the 
tensions that had been accumulating since 1964 and that exploded in 1968. At the bottom, 
the U.S. Service read in the attitude of the bishops a pessimistic assessment of the 
situation and a readiness to oppose the government at any moment.108 
The Church wanted to be united behind any measure they may take. The previous 
year had been marked by a relation with the government through individual actions and 
statements. For the year of 1969, the bishops judged, facing a more authoritarian state, 
individual opposition would only lead to more repression. The Church’s struggle for one 
institutional posture in regards to the regime would take the remaining years of the 1964-
1972 period. Based on the information the U.S. officers could obtain, they were under the 
impression that the Church was moving towards a policy of support to those affected by 
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repression but in a very conciliatory way.109 A glimpse of the Church’s attitude is the 
comment of a reporting officer after a conversation with the leaders of the Church in Belo 
Horizonte that, as a result of the case of the French Assumptionists, was in the center of 
the debate: 
Belo [Horizonte] Church leaders regard the Church as the only national institution capable of 
resisting the government and believe the Church must continue to work for social change in 
Brazil. At the moment, however, they appear to have decided to play this role in a low-key 
manner, believing that Church unity would be endangered and popular support lacking if they 
attempted to actively confront the government in the spheres of political activity. This restraint 
will end, however, if the government takes repressive measures against the Church or if the 
government fails to find solutions to pressing national problems.110 
At the request of the Northeastern bishops who had suffered the heaviest 
repression, the Central Commission of the CNBB had an extraordinary meeting on 
February to set its position towards the AI5.111 The resulting document resembled the one 
of May of 1964 in comprising the broad plurality of the Church; it expressed deep 
concern about the consequences the AI5 would have on the human rights situation of 
Brazil and regretted the “existing misinterpretation and incomprehension concerning the 
activities of the Church in our country, even if there has been imprudence—which we 
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equally regret.”112 No less importantly, the bishops also expressed the need for re-
democratization “as soon as possible.” At the same time, they diplomatically expressed 
desire to collaborate with the government.113 In spite of the different elements of the 
document and the myriad of likely interpretations, for the U.S., in some respects the 
CNBB declaration was a truce.114 
However, the situation in the Northeast was still worrisome. The clergy of that 
region were particularly reluctant to overlook the social situation; ergo they kept being 
targeted by military repression. Probably as a consequence of the military control of press 
and media, the events of the Northeast were treated as a regional problem. One event that 
did not remain in the Northeastern context but shocked the nation and had international 
consequences was the torture and murder, on May 26 of 1969, of father Antônio 
Henrique Pereira da Silva Neto. 
The 28 year old priest was the cleric responsible for the Catholic University 
Youth in Recife and worked very closely with Dom Hélder Câmara. Father Henrique had 
replaced Luis de Sena and Almery Becerra, two Brazilian priests who had been forced to 
leave the country as the regime issued death threats against the bishop and anyone who 
worked with him. After the murder of Henrique, the authorities did their utmost to divert 
the investigation and distract the public attention. In the communications of the Consulate 
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in Recife about the crime, the U.S. diplomats show an almost nonexistent capacity to 
distrust the diverting thesis of the authorities that very quickly presented the murder as a 
crime of passion: 
Thus far there is no firm evidence indicating who responsible for murder. Speculation in Church 
and university circles is that Communist Hunters Command (CHC), right-wing terrorist 
organization is responsible. Police sources, however, say privately it probably “crime of passion” 
with no political motivation. Recife press, operating under self-censorship gives scant attention to 
murder which covered on inside crime pages by short factual account supplied by police.115 
It is worth noting how in the cable the ideology and alignment with the regime is 
shrouded with an aura of objectivity. The reporting officer does not only overlook the 
whole context of persecution and repression but does not show the minimum critical 
distance from the official version that heavily relied upon strict censorship. Even six 
months later, when referring to the crime, the American cables would be faithful to the 
variable official versions that by December suggested the crime had been committed by 
“degenerate drug users.” The Consulate easily dismissed the indications of a political 
crime as a consequence of “emotional suspicion” of the Church.116 
For the U.S., the causes of the crime and its connections with a state of terror in 
Brazil were not as important as its effect on public opinion and the strain it could bring to 
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the Church-state relations.117 There was also concern for an intensification of Dom 
Hélder’s denunciations against the government. Two days after the crime, the comment 
of a telegram read: “Dom Hélder likely to regard incident as consistent with alleged 
strategy to have him shifted by Church even if military authorities opposed to this sort of 
terrorist action.”118 As in previous years, the American Foreign Service did not show any 
interest in freedom, democracy nor the life those who opposed the dictatorship but in the 
fate and stability of the regime. 
The General Assembly of the CNBB in July of 1969 was expected to be a new 
moment of definition of the Church regarding the political situation of the country. The 
American officers were very interested in the possible outcomes of the meeting, 
particularly in the position the Church would adopt in its relation with the government.119 
The sources of the U.S. officers indicated that the Church would maintain its moderate 
position. 
The replacement of Nuncio Sebastiano Baggio with Umberto Mozzoni in June 
had been interpreted as a conservative turn in the policy of the Vatican towards Brazil. 
Baggio had been supportive with the progressives and the Brazilian government would 
have exercised some pressure in Rome to have him out of the country. Mozzoni, on the 
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other hand, was held as conservative.120 Another cable, of July also explored some 
signals from the Vatican that led the American officers to think that Rome was inclined 
to counterbalance the power of the Northeastern churchmen.121 In some way, the U.S. 
officers were correct in their predictions. In spite of the murder of Father Henrique and 
the escalation of the military repression, the Assembly did not end with a basic statement 
about Church-state relations. The Church, if anything, maintained what seemed the 
moderate position of February, an outcome that, in the opinion of the U.S., must have 
seemed disappointing for the progressives.122 
Collaboration for Social Change 
The interest of the U.S. in the Catholic Church made a significant leap in the year 
of 1969. Of the total of 167 documents and 552 pages for the 1964-1972 period, 61 
documents and 249 pages are from 1969. As a consequence of the issuance of the AI5, 
that was a very intense year, full of skirmishes and confrontations. Moreover, 1969 
started a very slow process of change in the American interest in the Church; a process 
that continued at least until 1972, the limit of this study. 
The cautious position of the hierarchy after the AI5 contributed to the shift in the 
American view of the Church. Not a little contributed to the shift in the American view of 
the Church the moderate position of the hierarchy after the AI5. The spirit of that posture 
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was deeply expressed in the conciliatory statement of February and the lack of any 
statement regarding Church-state relations in the General Assembly of July. Taking into 
account the previous American preoccupation with the disruption that the Church-state 
conflict brought to the regime, that new attitude (easily comprehensible on the other 
hand, bearing in mind the few options of the Catholic hierarchy) meant good news for the 
United States. 
A conversation between Cardinal Dom Agnelo Rossi and officers of the 
Consulate in São Paulo following the CNBB meeting of February helps to understand 
some elements of the shift in the American view by 1969. In the conversation, the 
Cardinal expressed his preference for a “middle-of-the-road position” of the Church in 
regards to the regime. He criticized Dom Hélder for “provoking” the government and for 
his inappropriate criticisms of capitalism and U.S. policy. At the same time, the prelate 
expressed disagreement with the conservatives in the Church who favored the hardline 
military “one-hundred-percent.”123 
Rossi said that he had opposed those who, in the meeting of February, wanted a 
stronger position of the Church regarding the AI5. In his opinion, that attitude would 
exacerbate the situation and the Church would lose capacity of influence over the regime. 
More interestingly, Rossi “appeared confident that the U.S. Government authorities 
would also find the message an excellent one with which we could agree.” The attitude of 
Rossi, though conciliatory and moderate, was also characterized by a strong spirit de 
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corps. He had refused the National Order of Merit Medal the generals had awarded him 
with in order to “preserve his independence of [sic] the government.”124 
The primary element of the emerging American rapprochement to the Church was 
a systematic effort to know it more deeply. During 1969 the Church, not only in Brazil 
but in Latin America in general, was the object of close observation as indicates a cable 
from the State Department on April of that year that deals with a systematic “intelligence 
estimate” on the Church. The cable asked the U.S. missions in Latin American countries 
for contributions to the study: 
In particular, our interest is so far focused upon 1 the internal structure of the Church, [underlined 
in the original] its various factions and leaders as they relate to the problems of social, economic, 
and political development; 2 the social doctrines of the Church as they are interpreted by the Latin 
clergy, and particularly as they relate to reform, the development process, and violence as a means 
to achieve change; and 3 the alliances and relations with other groups, such as political parties, 
labor organizations, youth groups, and the military. We hope to reach some conclusions on the 
political and social significance of the Church in Latin America and the ways in which it is a force 
for and against various kinds of development there.125 
This cable can be taken as a point of convergence of different American views of 
the Church. On one hand, the logics of the National Security Doctrine are still present, 
particularly in the second point that suggests likely inclinations of the churchmen to the 
use of violence. But the Church is also seen here as an agent of development and 
consequently a likely ally of the United States. That view of the Church would be 
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recurrent in the next months and years and gradually diminished the vehemence of the 
National Security ideology in the cables. 
Beyond any ideological position of the State Department, what is clear is that 
there was a deep interest in the Catholic Church, regarded as an actor of major relevance 
and influence in Latin American politics. This perception was the consequence of the 
intense political participation of the Church in 1968 and 1969. All four major reports (the 
most complete, deeply thought and best structured type of cable) for the whole 1964-
1972 period were issued in mid-1969.126 Two of them dealt exclusively with the Church 
in the Northeast. It should be clear by now the reasons for the American special interest 
in the Church of that region. 
A first report, 11 page long and entitled “Consulate General Seeks Broadened 
Dialogue with Northeast Churchmen,” was issued in Recife on July 30 of 1969.127 The 
general framework of the cable was the need of the U.S. to seek dialogue with sectors 
disposed to and capable of social change in the Northeast. The military and the economic 
elites were major forces but the cable judged them unlikely to be inclined to social 
change. Since the issuance of the AI5 the political class of the region had been affected 
by cassation and cast out from the exercise of power, the students had been hit by 
punitive actions, organized labor was weak and divided, and the communications media 
had been censored. 
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Thus, the Church emerged as the most important actor for social change in the 
Northeast “simply by the process of elimination.” The report advocated for “priority 
attention” to the Northeastern Church “both as a potential important political force 
affecting Brazil’s future and as a potential agent for significant social change.” But the 
cable also considered positively other elements (elements that had been judged 
unfavorably in the previous years) for the need of an intense U.S.-Church collaboration. 
The cable dealt with the involvement of the Church in social change, the general 
criticisms among the churchmen of the U.S. policies and the situation of American 
clergymen in Brazil. In a pragmatic way, the cable asserts: “Despite outward 
appearances, we have found many churchmen willing and even eager to engage in 
meaningful dialogue, and some to be susceptible to influence. […] The extensive links of 
churchmen through the region, within Brazil, and abroad, not only give our efforts here a 
potentially large multiplier effect, but it may also open alternative avenues of approach to 
this group.” The State Department wanted to use the strengths of the Church to penetrate 
Brazilian society. 
The report explained some approaches to Catholic and Protestant leaders in the 
Northeast, pointing out the reservations of the progressives but also their willingness to 
collaborate with the U.S. Out of the meetings with the religious leaders of the Northeast, 
which included the conspicuous Hélder Câmara and several American priests and 
missionaries, emerged the “subject of the preparation and training of churchmen and 
women,” a subject that would grow in importance during the next weeks. 
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A 17 page long cable was issued on August 22 also from Recife. It was the first 
part of a twofold report that, as a whole, dealt with the religious actors of the Northeast. 
The first was devoted to the Catholic Church and the second to other religious actors. 
This cable follows closely the guidelines of the cable from Washington of April (see note 
115) and described the relevance of the Church in the Northeast, its conflicts with the 
military, its inner debates, its finances, the functioning of the institutional structure and 
the relation with other sectors. The cable still shows the sort of concern characteristic of 
the National Security Doctrine: 
Radicals and some progressives, among the Northeast clergy are not completely intimidated, 
moreover, by the Church’s theoretical rejection of violence. Rather, they tend to give some degree 
of acceptance to the counter-argument that institutionalized violence already exists, and that by 
taking arms the people would be really acting only in self-defense. Dom Fragoso, Archbishop José 
Maria Pires of João Pessoa, and even Dom Hélder himself, have indicated varying degrees of 
sympathy with this line of argument.128 
Nonetheless, this cable, as the previous major report, also depicted the Church in 
the Northeast mainly as an “institutionalized force for modernization of the economic and 
social structure which is essential to development in the Northeast.” A most important 
element of this report is the focus on all the aspects related to priesthood. It delved into 
the “crisis in the recruitment of priests,” the consequent relevance of the foreign clergy, 
and even the political postures of the priests according to their nationalities. 
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For obvious reasons, the interest augmented when it came to American clergy. 
The cable concluded that the American priests were neither as traditionalist as Italians, 
Portuguese and Brazilians nor as radical and compromised as the Dutch and Germans. 
American clergy would follow a rather Protestant-like line that encouraged participation 
of laity and “get close to the people at the lowest economic and social levels.” American 
officers seemed interested in reaching those levels of Brazilian society. 
A third major report came in September but this one broadened the perspective 
from the Northeast to the whole country. The cable of 27 pages was signed by 
Ambassador Charles Elbrick who had replaced John W. Tuthill in March of 1969.129 The 
report went along the same lines of the previous two, focusing on institutional 
information such as “the native and foreign priesthood, recruitment of priests, Church 
attendance, the role of the laity, current church educational and labor policies, the 
ecumenical movement and its radical tendency.”130 
Moreover, this cable stressed some elements that had been emerging in the 
previous reports, namely the crisis of vocations to the priesthood, the situation of foreign 
priests and the diverse elements of clergy recruitment. The U.S. had noted that by the end 
of the 1960s, one of the biggest problems of the Brazilian Church was the massive 
abandonment of priesthood, particularly by young and progressive priests, who were 
feeling frustrated by the difficulties in implementing the reforms of the Council. 
                                                            
129 Green, We Cannot Remain Silent, 102. 
 
130 Report, Rio de Janeiro, September 5, 1969, State Department Cables, U.S. Embassy, Brasilia, National 
Archives, box 33. 
 82 
On the other hand, during 1969, after the scandal around Father Comblin’s study, 
and particularly after the expulsion of the Oblates, foreign priests, particularly the 
Americans, demanded the attention of the U.S.131 In several cables, the Foreign Service 
provided quantitative and qualitative information as queried by Washington.132 A cable of 
June, for instance, as a response to the instructions of the CIA, provided detailed 
information about the ideological postures of foreign clergymen who would be “pushing 
too hard for social and economic reforms.” The cable also dealt with the attitudes of the 
Brazilian priests towards their fellow American churchmen. In their answer, the 
American diplomats drew the panorama of the different political postures and approaches 
to social reality in accordance to the nationality of the priests. Yet, at the same time, the 
cable showed sincere concerns about the security of the American priests in Brazil.133 
A fourth major report, issued in Recife on October, should help to understand 
how the American interests in the crisis of priesthood, the situation of the foreign priests 
and the diverse elements of clergy recruitment are connected. On the basis of the 
perception of the Church’s “significant potential as an agent of development and social 
change,” and taking into account “the many setbacks and frustrations which individual 
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clergymen endure in their difficult and frequently misunderstood social-action oriented 
pastoral activities,” the cable outlined a likely U.S.-Church cooperation.134 
The cooperation would consist of American assistance in the training of priests, 
foreign or Brazilians, in order to strengthen “the ability of the Catholic and other 
Churches in Brazil to contribute to development.” The report proposes a few likely 
programs and explores the ways to make them possible. Not only the U.S. and the 
Brazilian Catholic Church would participate in the programs but also the American 
Catholic Church, universities and institutions such as the Center for Inter-Cultural 
Formation (Centro de Formação Intercultural, CENFI) in which foreign churchmen, 
diplomats and lay people were oriented when arriving to Brazil. According to the cable, 
American officers had been consulting with the religious leaders of the Northeast for the 
formulation of these plans. 
In perspective, the proposal was the outcome of that systematic effort at gathering 
information about the Church in 1969. Clearly, the increasing interest of the State 
Department and other agencies in the situation of the foreign clergy and the priesthood 
crisis was pragmatic. The crisis of the Church meant an opportunity for the U.S. that saw 
the American religious missions in Brazil as an opportunity to penetrate and influence the 
Church. 
Gradually, after 1969 the suspicion towards the Church that was so evident in the 
cables of the first five years of dictatorship became less vehement. The Church was 
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increasingly seen as an agent with an enormous capacity for social change and less as a 
threat to the stability of the regime. The language of National Security was giving room 
to a spirit of collaboration for social change and modernization. 
In all these major cables of 1969, the American officers constantly mentioned the 
criticisms of the progressive Northeastern churchmen of the U.S. Even though the 
hierarchy had some hopes in a likely alignment of the American government with human 
rights issues, the churchmen openly reproached the U.S. through the diplomatic officers. 
This would also stimulate the desire to influence the Church in order to change the 
negative image it had of the U.S. 
In this regard, it is noteworthy that the new “collaboration for social change” 
approach was focused on the Northeast, where the Church was more progressive and 
likely to criticize the U.S. It could easily be interpreted that the American agencies were 
trying to encourage their own view of social change in the Northeast in order to 
counteract the relevance of the most progressive views; 
The collaborationist view of the Church emerged in the aftermath of the AI5 and 
the international concern for the human rights situation in Brazil. The aforementioned 
subtle shift in the U.S. view of the regime had as a consequence an American 
rapprochement to the democratic sectors of Brazil.135 Sooner or later, probably as a 
consequence of international pressure, the military would go back to the barracks and 
those sectors would take back the reins of the Brazilian state. Nevertheless, most of the 
democratic opposition had gotten smashed by the repression. Unlike parties and 
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collegiate bodies that depended on the state, the Church was not only independent but 
rivaled it in political importance and social scope. 
Therefore, although the lay organizations of the base and the Catholic press were 
dismantled or silenced, the CNBB not only remained standing but was even gaining in 
cohesion and international support. The deepening of the repression during 1968, the 
threats against foreign priests and the issuance of the AI5 were awakening an 
international consciousness. Furthermore, the Brazilian Church was getting the attention 
of the Vatican and building fruitful relations with the American Catholic Church, 
brazilianist scholars, the protestant churches and emergent organizations for the defense 
of human rights.  At least in the case of the Oblates, the U.S. could feel sympathy for the 
persecuted and repressed of Brazil. 
The Transformation of the Church 
Still, during the second half of 1969 the U.S. officers kept reporting on situations 
that affected Church-state relations. The most relevant of these events was the arrest and 
torture of members of the Dominican order who were linked to leftist groups in arms. 
Faithful to the posture adopted after the issuance of the AI5, the bishops refrained from 
public and open confrontation with the military. Thus, these situations did not ignite the 
public confrontation of other times. Although some U.S. officers understood the 
“prudence” of the Church as a blow to the progressives, the Church was plainly not 
accepting of the behavior of the military. A strong institutional discourse and praxis of 
protection of human rights was emerging. Around human rights, the Brazilian Church 
would reach its moment of greatest union and became the main opponent to the regime. 
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The moderate attitude of the Church was tied to the growing leadership of Dom 
Eugênio de Araújo Sales.136 Repression in Salvador had been fruitful in breaking the 
student and lay movement that had maintained the Northeast as a fortress of the 
liberationists. The appointment of Dom Eugênio as archbishop of Salvador in October of 
1968 was seen by the U.S. as a blow to the progressivism in the Northeast and 
particularly to that of the Benedictines of the São Bento Monastery.137 The U.S. officers 
judged that with him in Salvador, Dom Timóteo Amoroso Anastácio and Dom Jerônimo 
de Sá, largely regarded as controversial, would lose ground. However, by 1970 they were 
still in the sights of the U.S. officers.138 
Yet, the figure of Dom Eugênio was too complicated to fit into the 
conservative/progressive scheme. As a matter of fact, the American cables of the time 
contradicted each other by regarding him at times as conservative and at times as 
progressive.139 What is clear is that Dom Eugênio was stamping a cautious attitude in the 
Church in which there were strong criticisms against the government for human rights 
violations though through institutional ways. “He [Eugênio] seemed especially interested 
in trying to portray the Church and himself as vigorously involved in the struggle against 
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torture, murder and other violations of personal liberties committed by police and other 
security officials.”140 
Broadly, that was the policy followed by the Central Commission of the CNBB in 
the meeting of February of 1970. Then, the Church officially adopted the posture of low 
key dialogue that had been striving to reach during one year. During 1970 the Church 
was still the object of intense observation by the U.S. diplomatic corps. Although the flux 
of cables lowered considerably in comparison to the previous year, 1970 was the second 
most important year of the U.S. interest in the Brazilian Church for the 1964-1972 period, 
with 42 documents and 110 pages. 
For those who interpreted the new position of the Church as harmless to the state, 
the annual Assembly of bishops on May of 1970 would prove them wrong. In that 
meeting, the bishops continued to follow the policy of avoiding open confrontation but at 
the same time they strongly repudiated the use of torture.141 The fact that the resulting 
pastoral letter of the meeting, issued on May 27, included a statement that totally 
condemned the human rights violations was an achievement in comparison to the lack of 
agreement of the previous year.142 
The outcome of the Assembly of May was a direct consequence of the systematic 
persecution the Church had suffered since 1968 and the deepening of the repression after 
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the AI5. On one hand, the repression was successfully undermining the grassroots that 
constituted the support of the progressive bishops; in consequence, the conservatives 
were having more room for manoeuver and were exerting considerable pressure on the 
most outspoken progressives to stop their denunciations of the social calamities. 
However, at the same time, most churchmen discerned that the persecution was 
not limited to the progressive sector but it was directed to the Church as a whole. The 
murder of father Henrique, but also the successful Assembly of CELAM awakened the 
esprit de corps of the majority of the bishops, regardless of their political posture. Since 
1969, those bishops commonly held as conservatives had been giving signals of 
disappointment with the regime and the southern churchmen started supporting more 
decisively the northeastern ones. 
In January of 1969, for instance, the Foreign Service had noticed that Dom José 
Lafaiette, auxiliary bishop of São Paulo, who was usually portrayed as conservative, was 
“outraged” by the regime. Feeling that his Church was being seriously challenged, he 
would “react vigorously.” The American officers noted that in this regard, his position 
“appeared to differ very little from that of the progressive Dominicans.”143 
Another cable, of February of 1970, described a very similar situation for 
archbishop of Goiana, Dom Fernando Gomes dos Santos: “Having been the target of 
criticism from the left wing prior to the revolution of 1964 he now finds himself equally 
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critized [sic] by the group in power in 1970.”144 I have also mentioned how Dom Jaime 
de Barros Câmara had resented the expulsion of the Assumptionists. Since 1969 he and 
Dom Eugênio had become vocal in the defense of human rights. 
The signs of discomfort from conservative and moderate bishops continued at 
least until the end of the period that this study covers. In September of 1971, Dom Avelar 
Brandão Vilela, one of the most prominent moderates, with close ties to the military and 
also the president of the Latin American Episcopal Conference since 1968, gave a speech 
at the Superior War College. On that occasion, the bishop not only criticized openly the 
National Security Doctrine and the repression of youth and dissidents but went as far as 
taking to task the regime “for not improving the distribution of wealth, observing that in 
Brazil rich becoming richer and poor poorer.”145 The disappointment was massive. 
The defense of human rights and the denunciation of torture were cohesive factors 
for the episcopate that adopted a determined and institutional position in the defense of its 
militants, churchmen and anybody affected by the repression. The commitment of the 
Church to human rights was an international issue per se. Facing the strict limitations in 
Brazil, the Church, the exiles and the defenders of human rights resorted to the 
international community, and to the Vatican in particular, which fully supported the 
Brazilian Church. 
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A central pillar of the Church’s praxis in the defense of human rights was the 
Brazilian Commission for Justice and Peace. The Commission had been in gestation 
since the meeting of CELAM in Medellin and was officially created on October of 
1969.146 This transnational enterprise helped to transform the perception of the Brazilian 
Church from an institution that inappropriately got involved in politics, into a champion 
of human rights and a legitimate institutional dissident. Gradually, the Church was 
becoming the most critical antagonist of the regime. Ironically, in doing so, the Church 
had silenced the most progressive of its individual voices. 
In the following weeks after the assembly of the CNBB of May, bishops and 
generals, both trying to hide their internal fissures, were trying to get to agreement. A 
partial result would be achieved by July: “source stated that GOB, increasingly sensitive 
to damage international image and prestige, proposed quid pro quo in which CNBB 
would refrain from all activities to propagate stories violence abroad and GOB would 
take reciprocal steps to reduce chances mistreatment prisoners.”147 This indicates that the 
human rights campaign was having success. 
Precisely, that success of the international campaign for human rights enraged the 
military, who intensified the persecution of Catholic organizations such as the Catholic 
Youth Workers and the ACO in the second half of 1970.148 At the height of the 
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persecution in October, the police broke into the offices of the Jesuit Brazilian 
Development Institute (Instituto Brasileiro de Desenvolvimento, IBRADES) in Rio de 
Janeiro and detained the occupants, including bishop Dom Aloísio Lorscheider.149 
If that was not enough, the use of torture was becoming massive. In a cable from 
the northern city of Belem of September 14, an American priest gave details of the torture 
of father José Antonio Monteiro Magalhães, who had been arrested with the French priest 
Xavier de Maupeon in August in the city of São Luis.150 This sort of actions, which were 
internationally denounced by the Church with the support of the Vatican, undermined the 
image of the Brazilian regime overseas.151 
Meanwhile, some bureaucratic changes were taking place within the Church. In 
October 23 of 1970, Cardinal Agnelo Rossi was appointed director of the Sacred 
Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith (also known as Congregation for 
Evangelization of Peoples) and was replaced in the archdiocese of São Paulo by bishop 
Dom Evaristo Arns. This was an important moment for the commitment of the Church to 
human rights. From São Paulo’s archbishopric palace, Dom Evaristo would lead the 
Church’s mission in protection of human rights.152 
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A first round between Dom Evaristo and the regime was the trial, during February 
and March of 1971, of the Italian priest Giulio Vicini and the social worker Yara Spadini, 
who had been arrested and accused of subversion and militancy in the AP.153 American 
cables followed the details of the trial, constantly assessing the state of the political 
confrontation between the bishop and the military.154 In a report of September 9 that 
deals entirely with the situation of the Church during the first months of the year, the 
bishop’s defense of the two indicted was described as a “position that invited 
confrontation,” whose objective was to assure for Arns a prominent role in the CNBB 
conference that took place in February of 1971.155 
The Church and Human Rights 
The nine day meeting of the episcopate in February of 1971 in Belo Horizonte 
was a milestone for the Brazilian Catholic Church, implying a change of cycle. The 
CNBB had been marked by deep divisions and multiple agendas but in the two previous 
years had been trying to reach a minimal consensus to make the Church act as a united 
institution. The meeting of February of 1971 was the culmination of those efforts. 
The central point of the meeting was the election of new officers for the 
conference. With the departure of Cardinal Rossi to the Vatican some months ago, the 
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Church was in the need for a new reorganization in the structure of the Conference. Dom 
Aloísio Lorscheider, bishop of Santo Angelo, succeeded Rossi in the presidency. His 
cousin Dom Ivo, auxiliary of Porto Alegre, succeeded Dom Aloísio as General Secretary. 
Dom Avelar Brandão Vilela, bishop of Teresina and president of the CELAM, was 
elected vice president to replace of Dom Alfredo Vicente Scherer. Other important posts 
were also submitted to election, including the regional representatives to the 
Conference.156 
A 22 page long report issued on September by Ambassador William Rountree, 
who had replaced Charles Elbrick at the end of 1970, went into the details of the meeting. 
For the U.S., it was symbolically powerful that the bishops elected Dom Aloísio, who had 
been detained by the military, though only for a few hours, in October of 1970, as 
president of the Conference. Moreover, Dom Ivo, the new secretary, was actually held as 
a progressive. 
The ambassador remarked on the issuance of several documents at the end of the 
meeting that included a “proclamation presenting the basic orientation of the Church in 
today’s Brazil,” a total political success since it expressed consensus and set guidelines 
for the role of the Church in the medium-term. Furthermore, the CNBB issued open 
letters of support to Dom Evaristo Arns, Dom Waldyr Calheiros and the Dominican 
Order of São Paulo. The first was by then involved directly in the trial against the 
aforementioned Italian priest and the second was one of the top leaders of the progressive 
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sector and was leading a campaign for the defense of human rights in his diocese of Volta 
Redonda. Finally, the Dominicans of São Paulo were a common target of the regime that 
accused them of terrorism and subversion. A final aspect of the meeting, of deep 
symbolic connotation, was picked up by the ambassador: 
This support of three churchmen, who in the public mind at least were thought to represent active 
opposition to and confrontation with the State, was interpreted by many observers at the time as a 
signal that the CNBB was ready to move into an open position of greater opposition to the 
Government. The elections of more liberal CNBB officers seemed to confirm this hypothesis. So 
did the convention’s selection of a representative to give the closing statement to the assembled 
press corps. In a blunt challenge to the GOB, Dom Helder [sic] CAMARA, Archbishop of Olinda 
and Recife and outspoken leader of the progressive wing of the hierarchy (whose very name is 
anathema to the GOB), broke three years of silence vis-à-vis the Brazilian press. He did so 
dramatically by presenting a summary of the meeting and the various manifestos.157 
Something that does not appear in the cables which is vital to understand this 
important shift in the Church is the nature of the repression during the second half of 
1970. In previous years the bishops had been at least partially successful in negotiating 
and interceding for the victims of the repression by direct communication with the 
highest circles of the military establishment. In the last months, however, the military had 
been deliberately reluctant to accede to the petitions of the episcopate. Kenneth Serbin 
notes: 
Fearful of being associated with the revolutionaries, naively confident of the religious sentiment of 
the generals, and accustomed to social privilege, the bishops had taken years to understand the 
violent nature of the regime, which the Jocistas [Catholic Youth Workers] and other grassroots 
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militants had known all too well from the horrors of the jails. The bishops came to this realization 
only after the detention of Dom Aloísio “directly wounded” the bishops, forcing them “to take up 
a position of defense.”158 
The bishops negated that the Church was moving towards open conflict with the 
regime, something that, on the other hand, was never anything other than a press 
construction. Even in the moments of most dangerous tension, the episcopate, including 
most of the progressives, showed openness to dialogue with the military.159 At least 
according to the cables of the Foreign Service, the U.S. was not too aware of the Bipartite 
Commission, the space for high level dialogue between Church and government that 
started meeting since November of 1970 and that is described in detail by Kenneth 
Serbin.160 
For the remainder of 1971 and during 1972, the U.S. diplomats kept reporting on 
the Church, focusing again on its relations with the military. Confrontations took place as 
in the previous years with peaks and valleys determined by the legal or illegal actions 
against members of the Church and increasingly by facts of torture and violations of 
human rights. In June of 1972, for instance, thirty-six political prisoners, including three 
Dominican churchmen, started a hunger strike in protest against inhuman conditions that 
lasted more than one month and ended with the mediation of bishop Dom Evaristo Arns. 
A telegram of those days read: “Archbishop Arns left Sao Paulo [sic] for visit to Europe 
                                                            
158 Serbin, Secret Dialogues, 87-88. 
 
159 Report, Rio de Janeiro, September 9, 1971, State Department Cables, U.S. Embassy, Brasilia, National 
Archives, box 51. 
 
160 Serbin, Secret Dialogues, 92. 
 96 
and U.S. and in departure statement to press raised hunger strike. He said that again he 
had been denied access to prisoners.”161 
The transnational power of the Church had become the main problem of the 
military. By 1972, as a consequence of the continuous denunciation of torture, the image 
of the regime in European and American public opinion was irreparable.162 The case of 
the priest, Gerson da Conceição de Almeida, is very indicative in this regard. In a cable 
from Washington on July of 1972, there appears a sympathetic concern for the fate of the 
persecuted: “Senator Harris requests information on charges against Gerson da Conceicao 
[sic], the state of his health, the address and names of his family, and if he can be 
contacted by mail through the proper authorities.”163 
Father Gerson had been arrested with four lay people on October of 1971 in the 
southeastern estate of Espírito Santo. All of them belonged to a Catholic organization of 
social and educational assistance that had been founded by the American priest Edmund 
Nelson Leising. Father Gerson was imprisoned in Vila Militar in Rio de Janeiro without 
being formally charged of any crime. Gerson and his friends had been submitted to 
torture and one of them, Lucio de Brito Castelo Branco, had been placed on provisional 
liberty as he “needed special medical attention as a result alleged mistreatment.”164 All of 
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this information was provided by Leising himself to American officers in Rio de Janeiro 
who added: 
Embassy feels that extreme GOB sensitivity to what it would view as unwarranted interference in 
its internal affairs by USG precludes providing all of above unconfirmed information to Senator 
Harris, particularly if he intends to release and attribute it to either department and/or US embassy 
Brazil. Would therefore suggest following draft language possible reply for department’s 
consideration.165 
This cable shows the general sentiment of the military regime that was 
increasingly feeling isolated and overwhelmed by criticisms from abroad. It is very 
revealing that the military authorities would regard the American diplomatic corps in 
Brazil as a threat. Any network and institution with international scope, such as the 
academic community or the Church, represented a threat to the government. The main 
concern of the military was to conceal from the world their reiterated violations of human 
rights. Evidently, both the power relations among the Brazilian institutions and the 
American view of the country had undergone important changes in eight years. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Who is Observed? 
The intense observation of the progressive members and sectors of the Catholic 
Church by the U.S. was primarily related to the American view of those historical actors 
as dangerous and threatening. That view was determined by the progressives’ opposition 
to the dictatorship as well as by their eventual relation with ideologies held as 
revolutionary. Other important actors within the Church who did not represent a threat to 
the military regime garnered scarce attention. 
Tradição, Família e Propriedade (TFP) was recognized as an “ultra-rightwing” 
and “archconservative” Catholic movement that counted on the support of the regime in 
its confrontation with the progressive Catholics.166 Inspired by the corporativist and 
fascist regimes in Spain under Francisco Franco and Portugal under António de Oliveira 
Salazar, this group propagated corporatist and authoritarian ideas and was disdainfully 
regarded by the U.S. Although it did represent a threat to democracy, TFP appeared in 
only a handful of cables. In the same way, right wing bishops like Dom Sigaud and Dom 
Castro Mayer were not on the radar of the officers as were the progressives. 
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Students 
Organizations like the Movement for Basic Education, Catholic Youth Workers 
and Catholic University Youth, among others, were the subject of intense observation and 
concern. Those organizations were immense lay structures in which the so-called 
communist infiltration took place. However, as the repression deepened after the AI5, 
those weakened organizations gradually disappeared from the cables. Of particular 
concern for the U.S. was the relation between the Church and the students. 
The students and youth in general were the main objective of the state repression 
during the National Security dictatorships of the Southern Cone. Although in the first 
years of the Brazilian regime there was an evident split between the majority of the 
episcopate hierarchy and the students, there remained a strong relation between some 
bishops, priests, lay activists and the student organizations. 
Church-student relations involved two main problematic issues from the 
perspective of the U.S. officers. On one hand, the students, regarded as the breeding 
ground for terrorism and subversive movements, would influence negatively the 
churchmen and carry out the worrisome communist infiltration in the Church. On the 
other hand, since the very beginning of the dictatorship, the U.S. showed concern about 
the protection that the Church, particularly the orders and the progressive bishops, 
afforded to the students. 
That was one of the causes of the Church-state conflict that worsened in 1968 
when the majority of the churchmen seemed decided to protect the students from state 
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repression. In the aftermath of the AI5, the students were no longer a worry. Not only had 
the repression undermined the movement’s capacity of mobilization but there was a 
rupture with the Church. The moderate institutional approach of the Church and the 
consequent appeasement of the socioeconomic criticisms, particularly since 1969, made 
the youth feel abandoned by the hierarchy. 
Bishops 
Unlike the grassroots, which gradually lost relevance in the American cables after 
the deepening of the repression, the bishops were the most conspicuous sector from 
beginning to end. The conversations of American ambassadors, consuls and officers with 
bishops reveal a growing effort by the U.S. to establish good and collaborative relations 
with them. The bishops, on the other hand, always showed themselves receptive and open 
to dialogue with the American Foreign Service. A sign of this is the high quantity of 
conversations between churchmen and the U.S. officers. 
The main referent for the U.S. in regards to the Brazilian Catholic Church was the 
CNBB. The Conference of Brazilian Bishops was certainly the head of the national 
Church and the space that gathered most of its leadership. Changes in the balance of 
forces within the CNBB always affected enormously the rest of the Church; its annual 
meetings, general conferences and declarations were taken as navigational charts. Finally, 
readjustments in the top posts of the CNBB had enormous consequences for the direction 
the Church would take on very important issues. 
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Thus, the U.S. followed closely the meetings of the CNBB and the variations in 
the balance of power between progressives and conservatives. The public declarations 
that most of the time followed the meetings of the CNBB were always monitored and the 
quantity of cables dealing with the Church invariably increased as the meetings 
approached. Clearly, the American diplomats were interested in the reactions and 
institutional postures of the CNBB in regards to the regime. 
Naturally, the U.S. sought to create close ties with the main leaders of the Church: 
the archbishops of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Salvador, presidents and secretaries of 
the CNBB and the Apostolic Nuncio. Two of the most usual interlocutors of the Foreign 
Service were Dom Agnelo Rossi and Dom Eugênio de Araújo Sales. The American 
officers were always eager to know the postures of these bishops and held in high esteem 
their opinions. 
Dom Eugênio was particularly regarded as a top and ascending leader, an opinion 
that seemed to be shared by other personalities outside the Church.167 Dom Eugênio was 
bishop in Salvador da Bahia, first as administrator since 1964 and as Archbishop after 
1968. In April of 1969, he was elevated to Cardinal and in March of 1971, became 
Archbishop of Rio de Janeiro, quite a stunning career that seemed to accord with the 
capacities of the bishop. 
I have pointed out some contradictions in the U.S. interpretation of Dom Eugênio. 
In a cable of May of 1965, he is held, together with Dom Hélder and Dom Jerônimo, as a 
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leader of the “social minded Catholic priests.”168 Several times, when asked about Dom 
Hélder, Dom Eugênio expressed sympathy and proximity to the thought of the bishop of 
Olinda and Recife. However, in a conversation with the Consul of Salvador, Harold M. 
Midkiff, also on May of 1965, Dom Eugênio mentioned “some mistakes” of Dom 
Jerônimo and referred to Popular Action as a “dangerous organization.”169 
Later on, in April of 1969, a cable read: “The reporting officer detects a subtle 
change in Dom Eugênio’s attitude vis a vis the Military Regime (towards greater 
tolerance) possibly because of his new status in the College of Cardinals, and perhaps as 
the result of policy emanating from the Vatican.”170 Finally, for the Foreign Service, the 
appointment of Dom Eugênio as bishop of Rio de Janeiro was consequence of his good 
relations with the military. Dom Eugênio was the choice of the Vatican against the 
wishes of the local clergy who preferred the more progressive, Dom Aloísio.171 An 
accurate view would define Dom Eugênio as a very pragmatic figure who was highly 
interested in maintaining the public role of the Church through institutional means.172  
Some bishops were subject to deep observation not for their relevance in the 
balance of power within the Church but for their links with grassroots and students, their 
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criticisms of the socioeconomic situation and their skirmishes with the regime. Some of 
the more interesting for the U.S. were Dom Serafim Fernandes de Araújo of Belo 
Horizonte, Dom José de Medeiros Delgado of Fortaleza and Dom Antônio Batista 
Fragoso of Crateús. All of them were usual suspects in the U.S. view. Dom Fragoso, for 
instance, was held as a highly controversial figure who had expressed sympathy for 
Cuba, a crime of lese-empire by the time.173 
There was a particular interest in the São Bento Monastery of Salvador that was 
led by the Benedictines Dom Jerônimo de Sá Cavalcante and Dom Timóteo Amoroso 
Anastácio. They were seen as particularly suspicious for their progressive ideas and their 
commitments to the student movement. Other than Dom Serafim, all of these churchmen 
lived in the complicated Northeast. It is clear that the bishops from that region were 
regarded as particularly dangerous. 
Dom Hélder Câmara 
 Dom Hélder Câmara stood out among the progressive bishops for his 
revolutionary thought and the national and international recognition that he had as a 
religious leader. For the Diplomatic Service there was no one more controversial, 
important or dangerous than he. Dom Hélder was the reference of the American officers 
for understanding the progressive wing of the Church; thus his name was present in most 
of the cables of the period and there was a consistent effort in gathering information 
about his public interventions, reactions, travels, contacts and other activities. 
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In 1964, Dom Hélder was a rising international religious leader. In the next years 
he would be given honorary doctorates from Harvard, the Sorbonne and 30 other 
universities around the world.174 A master of public relations, until the dictatorship 
Hélder was always a friend or acquaintance of the presidents in turn. Other than the 
soccer player Pelé, Dom Hélder was probably the most famous person from Brazil in the 
1960s and 1970s. Because of his international recognition, during the dictatorship he, 
besides the intellectual Alceu Amoroso Lima, was probably the only dissident with a free 
voice.175 
Hélder Câmara was born in Fortaleza in 1909 and was ordained a priest when he 
was 22 years old. Since his youth, Hélder became involved in programs of public 
education of the state of Ceará, at a time when it was very common for priests to occupy 
bureaucratic posts. Naturally inclined to politics, Hélder had been a member of the ultra-
right movement of integralismo. In 1936, Hélder moved to Rio de Janeiro where he 
abandoned integralismo and moved closer to progressive intellectuals, politicians and 
churchmen; some of them were living the ideological transformation from traditionalism 
into rather liberal postures that he was living. 
In Rio, Hélder befriended the lawyer Sobral Pinto, the intellectual Alceu Amoroso 
Lima, the politician Santiago Dantas and the future bishop José Vicente Tavora; all of 
them were or would be key elements of the progressive circles of Brazil. In 1947, Hélder 
became vice-assessor general of the Catholic Action under the supervision of the 
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Cardinal Câmara, just at the moment in which the movement was strengthening and 
completing its transformation in a specialized pastoral movement of the French variety.176 
Hélder had always shown leadership skills and abilities in communication. He 
was central for the growth of the Catholic grassroots movement during the 1940s and 
1950s. In Catholic Action, Hélder opened up his horizons and developed a broad view of 
his Church and his country. The national organization of Catholic Action inspired him to 
create the National Conference of Bishops of Brazil that came to life in 1952 as was 
already mentioned.177 That same year, Hélder was named Auxiliary Bishop of Rio de 
Janeiro and first General Secretary of the CNBB. 
In 1955, during the International Eucharistic Congress of Rio de Janeiro, 
organized by him and his task team, Hélder, in association with Bishop Manuel Larrain 
of Chile, organized the first General Assembly of CELAM, the conference of Latin 
American bishops. Hélder had become a national celebrity and a promising leader of the 
Latin American Church. During the Vatican Council, Dom Hélder played an important 
role in strengthening the position of the progressive bishops and gained worldwide 
recognition as a dynamic leader. 
Human dignity, social justice and peace were the backbone of Dom Hélder’s 
thought; a global perspective that took into account the economic, political and spiritual 
dimensions of humanity. For him, the achievement of those mutually inclusive objectives 
was a revolutionary and necessary process. The centrality of non-violence in Dom 
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Hélder’s thought made him close to figures like Martin Luther King, Mahatma Gandhi 
and Nelson Mandela, leaders with whom the bishop felt deeply identified. Like them and 
like the biblical prophets, Dom Hélder was a tireless critic of the status quo and like them 
he faced persecution. In his position regarding capitalism, Dom Hélder, who was always 
open to dialogue, built bridges with elements of Marxism.178 Nevertheless, this did not 
stop him from formulating criticisms towards the socialist world led by the U.S.S.R that 
had produced the Berlin Wall and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
There is an important quantity of cables that mention Dom Hélder, reports about 
his speeches, public declarations and conversations with him. This indicates that, on one 
hand, the American officers had weighted well his relevance, yet on the other hand, Dom 
Hélder was a constant concern for the U.S. One of his speeches that riveted the attention 
of U.S. diplomats was delivered on May 2 of 1965 in Recife at the inauguration of the 
Northeastern Regional Seminary. On that occasion, the Minister Consul General Edward 
J. Rowell paid particular attention to the criticisms of the bishop to the developed 
countries and their “anti-American implications.” 
Rowell seems to catch a contradiction in Dom Hélder’s behavior: “Despite the 
tone of the speech he went out of his way to greet publicly the presence of [the American 
Catholic] Bishop Carroll and to thank the American hierarchy for its aid to the 
Seminary.” This suggests that for the officer, it was difficult to differentiate between an 
intellectual criticism of the U.S. and personal resentment toward U.S. citizens or Church. 
The cable follows: “Dom Hélder shows no signs of abandoning his views of the Church’s 
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role as an instigator of change and reform in society, nor his quasi-Marxist or---perhaps 
more accurately---“colonial” view of world affairs.” The officer also depicts the bishop 
as an egocentric whose expressions of humility are ostentatious. 
The paternalistic character of the National Security ideology is evident in 
Rowell’s comments: “Although observers’ views of his personality differ, the reporting 
officer, at least, finds what might otherwise be an obnoxious egotism much mitigated by 
an almost child-like enthusiasm and delight in what he is doing.”179 The cable also refers 
to a recent travel of the bishop to France where he had received ovations. This comment 
points out that by 1965, Dom Hélder was already being traced by the U.S. intelligence 
and/or diplomacy as a figure with international relevance. 
Part of the power of Dom Hélder was his good relations with the Vatican. Since 
he and monsignore Giovanni Montini met in 1950 in Rome, the two churchmen had 
cultivated a strong friendship. As important members of the Catholic Action in their 
respective countries, they had common grounds. Montini, first as Vatican’s Secretary of 
State and as Pope Paul VI after, had been a loyal supporter of the initiatives of the 
Brazilian bishop. All those elements were continuously weighted in the American cables 
of the time. 
For the U.S., the political strength and public postures of Dom Hélder were the 
main referent for the rest of the progressive wing. Consequently, the conflicts that 
involved the Brazilian security forces with the bishop had deep consequences for the 
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general relations between Church and state. The public declarations of Dom Hélder were 
usually taken as battle cries that incited the progressives to intensify their criticisms 
towards the regime. Occasionally, the opinions of the bishop would be interpreted in U.S. 
diplomatic communications as erroneous interpretations of reality. 
That was the interpretation of ambassador Tuthill of Dom Hélder’s criticisms of 
the failures of the Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast 
(Superintendência do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste, SUDENE) in 1968. In a cable of 
May 31, the ambassador endorsed a report that interpreted the criticism of Dom Hélder to 
SUDENE as the consequence of a misunderstanding by the bishop of the obstacles that 
the government faced in its efforts to develop the region.180 
The American collaborationist approach to the Church that timidly emerged in the 
aftermath of the AI5 was also applied to Dom Hélder. In a cable of January of that year, 
the Consulate in Recife showed itself willing to have a good relation with the bishop. The 
telegram referred to a cordial conversation between the officers of the Consulate and 
Dom Hélder in which the latter said “he understood officials and communications media 
in US had taken stand critical of recent events with media particularly critical.”181 The 
bishop also showed comprehension for the “difficult position” in which the U.S. was 
placed (see pp. 65-68). This indicates the willingness of both Dom Hélder and the 
Consulate to establish a fluent dialogue. 
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Yet, Dom Hélder remained an undesirable element for the U.S. In March of 1969, 
during a graduation ceremony in the Catholic University of São Paulo, Dom Hélder made 
“a strident call for basic reforms in Brazil.”182 In April, the Consulate of Recife reported 
acts of violence and terrorism from the extreme right in which elements of the Command 
of Communist Hunting (Comando de Caça aos Comunistas, CCC) took part with the 
acquiescence of military authorities in Recife; the telegram alerted readers that the 
“situation is further complicated by Archbishop Dom Helder Camara’s recent more 
bellicose posture [that] clearly indicates willingness to risk confrontation with 
government over student issue.”183 Naturally, the “student issue” in this context means 
support of the student movement in spite of the disapproval of the regime. Later on, the 
Consulate reported that the bishop “used the occasion of masses on June 27 
commemorating the 30-day anniversary of the murder of Father Antonio Henrique 
Pereira Neto again to speak out publicly against the prevailing political situation.”184 
Dom Hélder was the enemy number 1 of the military regime. The murder of 
father Henrique was the height of a systematic campaign against the bishop that included 
mortal threats, machine-gunning of his house and other intimidating tactics. Moreover, 
the military and the U.S. officers expected that the repression of the progressive Catholic 
grassroots movement would undermine the power of the bishop. Conversely, the military 
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contributed to making of Dom Hélder a worldwide prophet and a symbol of religious-
based opposition to the status quo. 
The Department of State had always been watchful of the travels of Dom Hélder, 
particularly to the U.S. In November of 1969, an officer of the Consulate of Recife 
visited the bishop in the Archbishop’s palace and asked him about his plans for travel to 
North America and Europe scheduled for January of 1970. The officer was not only 
interested in the content of the bishop’s message, but also in the funding for the travel as 
suggested by the mention of the matter in the cable: “According to Dom Hélder, his visits 
to Canada and the United States will be sponsored by “church groups and universities,” 
including the University of Detroit and Columbia University.”185 
The international prophetic mission of Dom Hélder caught even greater attention 
of the U.S. Service in 1970.186 The “low key” posture of the Church, adopted since 1969 
and made official in the CNBB meeting of February of 1970, had reduced the capacity of 
communication of Dom Hélder, the clearest individual voice of the Church. More 
importantly, the military expressly prohibited the reproduction of Hélder’s statements or 
even the mention of his name in the media. Consequently, the bishop had to find his 
audience in the international community. 
Interestingly enough, the U.S. was for Dom Hélder a place of free speech, where 
he was not submitted to the sort of attacks that he was used to facing in his own country. 
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After a conversation of Dom Hélder with ambassador Elbrick, the consul Donor Lion and 
another officer of the Consulate, in August of 1969, the diplomatics noted: “Dom Hélder 
remarked that it was ironic that the American Ambassador and other US. Government 
officials in Recife were unafraid to meet with him while many Brazilian authorities, both 
civil and military seemed intimidated.”187 
As in many other conversations with American officers, Dom Hélder did not hide 
his criticisms to the dictatorship’s “failure to implement basic reforms.” Moreover, the 
bishop always expressed his conviction of the potential of the U.S. to influence positively 
the Brazilian regime. With this outlook, the bishop tried to influence the American 
posture without expressing his criticisms to the U.S. in a negative way: “He claims that 
the US must bear a large measure of responsibility for correcting these injustices in Latin 
America since, whether the Latins like it or not, they are part of the United States’ zone 
of influence.”188 Though not obviously, the reproach was always there. 
Dom Hélder took abroad his discourse of non-violence and social justice. In 
United States, he not only addressed the problems of his country and the third world but 
also talked openly about the Vietnam War and the threat to democracy that the 
“industrial-military complex” represented.189 His impact in the U.S. was important; the 
bishop was central in the conformation of religious-academic networks that denounced 
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the Brazilian situation in the U.S. and Europe.190 Dom Hélder also had close ties with the 
Civil Rights Movement191 and leaders like the priest and activist Phillip Berrigan and his 
movement of denunciation of the Vietnam War.192 
The U.S. officers were aware of the success with which the “itinerant and highly 
controversial” bishop was denouncing the atrocities of the regime abroad. A cable of 
November of 1970 reported the accusations made by the Governor of São Paulo, Roberto 
de Abreu Sodré, against Dom Hélder after the Governor’s visit to Europe: “Apparently 
the Governor came back in a state of high pique consequent to the atmosphere of 
misunderstanding and hostility to Brazil he encountered in some quarters in Western 
Europe, notably in youth and journalistic circles.”193 The U.S. officers followed all the 
controversy in the course of which Abreu Sodré called the bishop a “Fidel Castro in 
cassock” and Cardinal Rossi interceded on behalf of Dom Hélder. That was only one 
example of the many attacks to Dom Hélder from the Brazilian establishment that 
strengthened the notion of Dom Hélder as a persecuted dissident. 
The monitoring of the activities of Dom Hélder, in Brazil and abroad, continued 
during 1971 and 1972. By that time, the bishop was already regarded as a prophet of his 
time. The U.S. consular view of him combined an awareness of his historical relevance 
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with the reservations that are already clear. In a cable issued in Washington on June of 
1971, George Lister, a central figure in the human rights policy of the State Department, 
expressed a desire to meet the bishop; this was in the framework of an eventual trip of 
Dom Hélder to Washington (finally aborted), where he had some academic and religious 
commitments sponsored by the National Office for Black Catholics.194 
The contact of Dom Hélder in Washington was Brady Tyson, a Methodist 
missionary and academic who was living in São Paulo at the time of the coup d’état but 
had left Brazil in March of 1966 due to pressures from the regime.195 Tyson was an active 
part of the international academic-religious network of denunciation and opposition to the 
Brazilian dictatorship, and would later join the diplomatic corps during the Jimmy Carter 
administration. 
The last cable of the 1964-1972 period that deals entirely with Dom Hélder, dates 
from August of 1972. In the report of a conversation, the recently appointed Consul of 
Recife, Calvin C. Berlin, commented on the current situation of Dom Hélder: “He gives 
the impression of being quite isolated from both official circles and sources of influence, 
a position that attests to the effectiveness of the government in cutting off his lines of 
communication. His ready accessibility may be due in large part to the fact that many 
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people hesitate to seek him out for fear of adverse repercussions on the part of the 
government.”196 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusions 
The Catholic Church was an important factor in the history of Brazil during the 
twentieth century. As a consequence of its involvement in the public life, a myriad of 
worldviews that can be interpreted as different political positions abounded in the 
Brazilian Church. In this context, a vital progressive movement emerged within the 
Church in the 1940s and 1950s. One principal factor in this development was the constant 
influx of European and North American priests. Foreign priests have had a significant 
presence in the Brazilian Church and were channels for the spread of avant-garde French 
Catholic ideas in Brazil. 
A common element of the French school was the importance given to the lay 
apostolate and the active dialogue with modern narratives. This was the basis for the 
development of Catholic Action, a group of lay organizations mainly constituted by 
young workers and students. Gradually, progressivist thought permeated all sectors of the 
Church, including the episcopate, but strengthened particularly within the orders and the 
Northeast region. Those sectors developed a social commitment to the subordinate 
classes and an ethical criticism of inequality, social injustice and oppression. As a result, 
the Catholic Church built strong ties with other progressive sectors of society, such as 
students, intellectuals and statesmen. 
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During the 1960s, in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, the forces of change, 
including the Catholic progressivism, got caught amidst a violent political confrontation 
that would prove definitive for the history of Latin America. United States was a 
principal instigator of this conflict. In the framework of the imperialist relations with 
Latin America, the U.S. spread the Doctrine of National Security as a means to maintain 
its hegemony in the region. The Doctrine, an international version of McCarthyism, was 
used to squash the progressive thought through the continent. 
The Doctrine, characterized by authoritarianism, paternalism and Manichaeism, 
fit well in the mind of the Latin American military. During the 1960s and 1970s, the 
United States encouraged, supported and at times arranged the imposition of military 
dictatorships in the Southern Cone. These dictatorships employed policies of terror and 
dirty war to destroy revolutionary and liberationist movements. Churchmen, intellectuals, 
and especially students, were the targets of the repression. The coup d’état that installed a 
20 year long dictatorship in Brazil in 1964, though orchestrated from the Brazilian 
military, was part of that broader process. 
Unable to distinguish among its enemies, and imbued with the Manichaean 
ideology of National Security, the dictatorship massively employed repression against the 
Catholic Church. Although the military were successful in undermining the Catholic 
grassroots, they actually generated an unfavorable attitude in most segments of the 
Church, including the powerful bishops. As a consequence, the first five years of 
dictatorship were characterized by several confrontations between the Church and the 
regime. 
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According to the lines of National Security, during this time the United States 
developed a great interest in the progressive sectors of Brazilian Catholicism, namely the 
Catholic Action movement, foreign priests and the bishops of the Northeast among 
others. Those sectors had the capacity to carry out important reforms in Brazil but were 
thought to be a threat to the interests of the U.S. The Catholic Action movement, one of 
the most progressive experiments in the history of the Church, was regarded as a factor of 
communist infiltration. Particularly alarming were the sympathies between churchmen 
and students, latter being anathema for National Security. During the repression of the 
student movement between 1966 and 1968, the State Department got very interested the 
São Bento Monastery, the orders and some bishops who supported and protected the 
youth from the state repression. 
Since most of the progressive movement was grounded in the Northeast dioceses, 
that region captured most of the attention of the U.S. The indisputable leader of the 
movement was the charismatic bishop of Olinda and Recife, Dom Hélder Câmara. This 
worldwide famous religious leader was for the U.S. the reference for the whole 
progressive movement. The cables of the American posts in Brazil during that time exude 
disapproval and even animosity towards this bishop, who was seen as a dangerous figure. 
During the 1964-1972 period, the U.S. followed closely the steps and words of Dom 
Hélder in Brazil and abroad. His dangerousness rested both in his prophetic mission and 
the wide recognition he enjoyed nationally and internationally. His criticisms of the 
status quo and denunciations of the repressive character of the regime, as those of the 
other progressive leaders of the Church, were for the U.S. undesirable acts of war. 
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“Church-state relations” was the overarching element of the American worries in 
regards to the Brazilian Church. It was a common label in boxes, folders and cables in the 
archives of the communications with the Foreign Mission in Brazil. Bearing in mind that 
during this period those relations were characterized by political conflict, the Church was, 
for the U.S, a destabilizing element for a military dictatorship that was seen, ironically, as 
defender of liberty and democracy. In regard to the public confrontations between both 
institutions, the American diplomats showed concern for how these conflicts undermined 
the image and legitimacy of the military. That explains the deep interest of the U.S. in the 
official positions of the CNBB toward the regime during the meetings of the episcopate. 
The United States was ideologically and politically committed to the Brazilian 
dictatorship from the very beginning. Therefore, the State Department’s interpretation of 
the Church was dictated by the American concern for the preservation of the regime 
rather than for justice and democracy. The interests and concerns of the U.S. officials 
must be contrasted with those important elements that are absent in the cables or that only 
obliquely receive attention. The “Church-state relations” approach is in some way 
deceitful. It implies the perception of a conflict between two equal parts; the reporting of 
Church-state relations has the appearance of a neutral assessment, based on a 
preoccupation with the preservation of democracy and stability in Brazil. But this 
objective language actually obscures the reality of the political persecution of the Church 
along with other organized groups by the military. 
Acts of violence against the Church were not a concern for the U.S., as a long as 
they did not represent a public confrontation capable of garnering new opponents of the 
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military. When reporting about arrests, detentions, torture and censorship, the officers 
invariably focused on how those events would be used to “criticize the government.” In 
that way, violations of human rights and the political persecution of the Church were 
highly hidden in the cables. That political commitment of the U.S. with the military 
regime was evident especially in the cables about the murder of father Henrique Pereira 
Neto in May of 1969. 
The American “Church-state relations” approach entails an irony. The physical 
and symbolic violence against the Church was less important than the public reaction of 
the Church or any of its members. In other words, the linguistic performances of the 
churchmen, such as speeches and public letters, and the journalistic coverage about them, 
were for the U.S. a more important element of the political struggle than torture and 
political persecution. The symbolic acts of the Church were regarded as “bellicose” 
statements that were used as weapons in leftist attacks against the regime. On the other 
hand, the military, at least in these cables, was presented chiefly as a rational and 
voiceless entity. 
The fact that public statements by bishops were, in the American view, the central 
element in the Church-state conflict brings up the relevance of the press. Newspapers 
were the space par excellence in which the public statements and letters of the bishops 
appeared. Particularly in the years prior to the imposition of full censorship, the press was 
the field in which the political confrontation took place. The enormous capacity of public 
opinion to affect the regime was demonstrated by the heavy efforts of the military in 
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imposing censorship. As any other authoritarian regime, the Brazilian dictatorship made 
an enormous effort to hide its atrocities. 
Besides personal conversations between the American officers and well-informed 
people, the press was the principal source of information for the U.S. about the Church-
state conflict. Obviously, part of the job of the officers was to submit the information that 
they gathered to critical analysis and contrast it with human sources. The analytical 
process allowed the officers to interpret reality more deeply than any newspaper. Still the 
reliance of American reporting officers upon the press confirms the centrality of mass 
media as a channeling element of public attention. 
The cables about bishop Dom Hélder Câmara are an example of how the 
American view of the Church was heavily influenced by the media. Most of the time, the 
bishop was described as “controversial” or even “highly controversial.” Controversy 
refers directly to a public matter, a public opposition that, at least until 1968, took place 
in the press field or was reproduced by the press. Therefore, the American view of Dom 
Hélder was highly influenced by the characterization that newspapers made of him. 
The interest of the U.S. in the Church, as any historical phenomenon, was neither 
static nor absolute. National Security did not account for the whole American view of the 
Church during those years. According to the cables, another view became very important 
after the radicalization of the dictatorship on December of 1968 when persecution 
became systematic and repression an official policy. This had as a consequence an 
increasing rejection of the Brazilian regime in the international scenario, namely in the 
United States and Europe. In this context, the Church opted for avoiding individual 
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confrontations with the military but adopted a policy of total opposition to the anti-human 
rights policy of the regime. That opposition resulted in protection of dissidents in Brazil 
and denunciation of the situation abroad. 
Then, the American interest had a subtle change. Besides the “Church-state 
relations,” an idea of the Church as a fundamental element for social change in Brazil 
emerged. This ignited a systematic effort to gather information and seek bilateral 
dialogue with the most conspicuous members and sectors of the Church. It was a 
pragmatic approach. As a prime order institution, with national reach that crosses all 
regions, classes, genres and political ideas, the Church was seen as a potential node for 
the U.S. intervention in Brazil. 
The “collaboration for social change” attitude of the kind of the Alliance for 
Progress has never been at odds with authoritarianism. Both are part of a historical 
dialectic present across the different aspects of the U.S. hegemony in Latin America that 
is commonly known as “carrot and stick approach.” Historically, when the U.S. refers to 
social change in Latin America, this means a very gradual process carried out through 
modernization and intended to appease progressive, liberationist and revolutionary 
movements. 
In sum, the American view of the Catholic Church in Brazil was determined by 
the political commitment of the United States to the Brazilian dictatorship. During the 
1964-1972 period the interest was ruled by the ideology of National Security Doctrine 
and the pragmatic need to establish collaborative relations with the most powerful sectors 
of Brazil. The understanding of the first approach is particularly important to understand 
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the changes in the religious-political arena of Brazil and Latin American during the 1970s 
and 1980s. Those were years characterized by an ecclesiastical and political reaction 
against the progressive sectors of the Catholic Church. 
Further Research Possibilities 
Further research endeavors in the field intended to deal with the political 
repression of Liberation Christianity and Liberation Theology should contain the 
continental perspective in which United States played an important role. Some of those 
endeavors could contain information from thus far classified information of the State 
Department and the CIA, which have been protagonists in the political and religious 
conflicts of Latin America for more than fifty years, though sometimes their involvement 
is obscured. Moreover, any research that uses cables of the American Foreign Service 
should include a call to question the legitimacy of the hegemonic presence of the U.S. in 
foreign countries through its diplomatic apparatus. 
Interestingly enough, the “Church-state relations” approach, so present in the 
cables used for this research, remains in the American scholarship about this important 
period of Brazilian history. The question arises as to whether this approach in the 
academic community still contains the methodological problems that became clear in this 
thesis. Meanwhile, I am hopeful that with this research I have contributed to the 
understanding of the international aspects of the Brazilian Catholic Church during the 
times of the dictatorship in which the works of Penny Lernoux and James Green remain 
so important. 
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The international approach should also contribute to understand the successes and 
failures of the progressive and liberationist national movements in Latin America. The 
deeds of the Brazilian Catholic Church during the dictatorship have had enormous 
consequences that have continued until today. The same judgment applies to Ecuador and 
Bolivia in which the Church helped to form the basis of deep processes of renovation that 
continue to the present day. Comparative works could help us understand how the 
different situations and behavior of the historical actors had positive and negative 
consequences for the social change and the still so unhopeful present of most of Latin 
America. 
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Appendix 1: Cable from Washington to Ambassador Gordon during the coup d’état 
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Appendix 2: Distribution of cables by months and years 
MONTH/YEAR 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972   
January 2         7 1   1   
February           11 2 5     
March         1 3 3 3     
April         3 4 3 2 3   
May   2     2 5 5       
June 3 2     1 6 3 1 2   
July         1 7 4 1 7   
August 2   3     7   2 3   
September         2 2 3 4 2   
October           1 9 1 1   
November           3 6   1   
December         1 5 3       
Total Docs 7 4 3   11 61 42 19 20 167
Total Pages 28 14 11   54 249 110 54 32 552
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Appendix 3: First page of cable (August 19, 1966) 
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Appendix 4: First page of cable (August 26, 1966) 
 
 
